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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 la-19(1) and
78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err by denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration when the
negotiated Addendum to the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract mandates that "[a]ny
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by the parties agreed upon
by both Buyer and Seller"?
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See R. at 483-498, 549-50). The trial
court's decision denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration presents a question of law, which
this Court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's
decision. See Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Section 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act provides:
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration
agreement or the scope of matters covered by the agreement, the
court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (1999).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
AND DISPOSITION BELOW
This case is based upon a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract")
entered into on June 14, 1998, between Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), as Buyer,
and Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively "PWA"), as Sellers.
(See R. at 26-31). Under the Purchase Contract, CFI was entitled to purchase approximately
twenty (20) acres of real property in Summit County, Utah, "subject to" certain "Special
Contingencies" being satisfied. (See R. at 29).
The Special Contingencies required, among other things, that Summit County grant
final Master Plan approval of the intended development, and that CFFs purchase of the
property close on or before December 31, 1998. (See R. at 29). Because the Special
Contingencies were not satisfied, including failure to close the transaction within the
prescribed time period, PWA understood that the Purchase Contract expired by its own terms
on January 1, 1999. (See R. at 101-115). Nevertheless, on November 9,1999, CFI filed this
action against PWA, seeking specific performance of the Purchase Contract and damages for
alleged breaches of the Purchase Contract. (See R. at 1-7). CFI also recorded a Notice of Lis
Pendens on the Property. (See R. at 88-90). PWA immediately notified CFI of its obligation
to arbitrate, and requested CFI to dismiss its Complaint and release the Notice of Lis Pendens.
(See R. at 17-19).
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When CFI refused to comply with PWA's request to arbitrate, PWA was forced to take
necessary measures in the trial court to obtain the immediate release of the Notice of Lis
Pendens, which was impeding development of The Canyons Specially Planned Area. (See
R. at 34-115). PWA thereafter moved the trial court to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration provision in the Addendum to the Purchase Contract. (See R. at 483-98). The trial
court denied PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See R. at 549-50).
Pursuantto Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-19(1), PWA sought immediate review of the trial
court's decision denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See R. at 552-55). PWA also
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the trial court pending this Court's review of the trial
court's decision. (See R. at 576-85). When the trial court denied that motion (see R. at 76870), PWA filed a similar motion with this Court. By Order dated October 17,2000, this Court
stayed all proceedings in the trial court pending the outcome of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

On June 14,1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract. The Purchase

Contract, subject to certain Special Contingencies being met, allowed CFI to purchase
approximately twenty (20) acres of real property in the "Frostwood Development" at The
Canyons Specially Planned Area in Summit County, Utah (the "Property"). (See Purchase
Contract, Addendum "A" hereto; R. at 26-31).
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B.

CFI, one of the world's largest timeshare development companies, intended to

buy the Property to build a 400-unit timeshare project before the 2002 Winter Olympics. (See
Affidavit of Mark Waltrip, R. at 290-99; see also R. at 658).
C.

The Purchase Contract originated from a pre-printed form used regularly by

members of the Utah Association of Realtors. (See Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III ("Plumb
Aff") at t 5, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 152-60).
D.

Paragraph 12 of the pre-printed body of the Purchase Contract contains a

boilerplate dispute resolution/mediation clause that would have required the parties to submit
disputes under the Purchase Contract to mediation before litigating them, if necessary. (See
R. at 28, Addendum "A" hereto).
E.

CFI and PWA, however, desired to modify and clarify certain provisions of the

Purchase Contract, including the standard dispute resolution clause. (See Plumb Aff. at fflj
5-7, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 157-59). Accordingly, on June 14,1998, in connection with
the execution of the Purchase Contract, CFI and PWA also executed Addendum No. 1 to the
Purchase Contract (the "Contract Addendum"). (See R. at 30-31, Addendum "A" hereto).
F.

Section 12 of the Contract Addendum contains an arbitration clause (the

"Arbitration Clause"), which changed the standard method of dispute resolution contained in
the body of the Purchase Contract. The Arbitration Clause provides:
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be
arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both buyer and seller. If
agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning
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of the arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and
this agreement shall be null and void.
(See R. at 30, Addendum "A" hereto).
G.

PWA negotiated to include the Arbitration Clause in the Contract Addendum

to avoid litigation and prevent delays in developing the Property. PWA desired to complete
the development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. (See Plumb Aff. at ^ 7, Addendum "B"
hereto; R. at 157).
H.

CFI likewise desired to avoid delays in its purchase and construction of the

Property, to ensure that the time-share units would be completed by the 2002 Winter
Olympics. (See Affidavit of David A. Seigel, at ^ 7; R. at 269-76).
I.

The provisions of the Contract Addendum, including the Arbitration Clause,

superseded the conflicting provisions in the body of the Purchase Contract. The Contract
Addendum states: "To the extent the terms of this Addendum modify or conflict with any
provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter offers, these terms shall
control." (See R. at 31, Addendum "A" hereto).
J.

Section 16 of the Purchase Contract (the "Default Clause") states that where a

section of the Purchase Contract "provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the
remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under
common law." (See R. at 31, Addendum "A" hereto).
K.

Section 9 of the Purchase Contract sets forth Special Contingencies, which

PWA believes were not timely satisfied, causing the Purchase Contract to terminate on its

UT DOCS A 1061346v 4

.^_

own terms because the transaction failed to close on or before December 31, 1998. (See
PWA's Answer and Counterclaim atfflf10-23; R. at 45-48).
L.

On November 9, 1999 - nearly eleven (11) months after the deadline for

closing the transaction, and on the eve of Summit County's approval of the 7,000 acre
development of The Canyons Specially Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"), of which PWA's
property was a part - CFI filed this action against PWA, seeking specific performance of the
Purchase Contract, damages for alleged breaches of the Purchase Contract, and other relief.
(See R. at 1 -7). CFI also recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the Property. (See R. at 88-90).
M.

Three days later, by letter dated November 12, 1999, PWA notified CFI that

filing the Complaint violated the Arbitration Clause, and that the Notice of Lis Pendens was
improper:
Due to the termination of the Purchase Contract, the filing of the
Complaint and recording of the lis pendens was improper.
Paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 expressly provides that 'any
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated
by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller.' Paragraph 12
was included in the parties' agreement for the express purpose of
avoiding litigation. More importantly, this paragraph supersedes
and replaces section 15 of the Purchase Agreement in that it
conflicts with the rights of the parties to submit the matter to
mediation. Since the terms of the Addendum modify and conflict
with section 15, the terms of Addendum No. 1 control.
(See 11/12/99 letter, Addendum "C" hereto; R. at 17-19). The letter not only requested CFI
to arbitrate the parties' dispute, but also requested CFI to dismiss the Complaint and release
the Notice of Lis Pendens. (See id.).
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N.

On December 13, 1999, because CFI refused to dismiss the Complaint or

release the Notice of Lis Pendens, PWA filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, requesting
the trial court to dismiss the claims against PWA and cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens
recorded against the Property. (See R. at 59-115). The Motion sought dismissal for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, based on the termination of the Purchase
Contract by its own terms for failure to close the purchase by December 31, 1998. (See R.
at 101-115). The Motion also explained that the Notice of Lis Pendens jeopardized the
development entitlements granted by Summit County in approving The Canyons SPA.1 (See
R. at 93-106). Alternatively, the Motion asserted that if the trial court did not dismiss the
claims against PWA, the trial court should enter an order compelling arbitration in accordance
with the Arbitration Clause:
[Bjecause Addendum No. 1 provides that its terms govern over
any inconsistent terms contained in the Purchase Contract, the
provisions in Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration are
controlling. As a result, in the event this Court denies PWA's
Motion to Dismiss, at the very least, the Court should enter an

The Canyons SPA is a master-planned resort community on 7,000 acres of land.
PWA's property was part of The Canyons SPA. As a requirement of development
approval, a portion of PWA's property was to be developed into four holes of an
eighteen-hole golf course. Development of the golf course was subject to strict
deadlines, and was one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the
development of The Canyons SPA. The Canyons SPA was to be developed in phases
by expanding outward from the inner "Resort Core," which was adjacent to PWA's
property. Thus, construction of the outer areas was conditioned upon progress in
developing the inner Resort Core, including PWA's property and the golf course. As
a result, CWsLis Pendens was a serious impediment to the development of the entire
Canyons SPA, not just to PWA's property. (See R. at 105-06; see also various
affidavits at R. at 116-193).
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order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract.
(See Memo, in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14 n.3, Addendum "D" hereto; R. at 93-115).
O.

On December 13, 1999, the same day on which PWA filed its Motion to

Dismiss and Quiet Title, PWA also filed an Answer and Counterclaim, which explicitly
referred to the Arbitration Clause, quoting it verbatim and asserting that filing the Complaint
and initiating litigation violated the Arbitration Clause. (See Counterclaim ^j 14, 41 & 42,
Addendum "E" hereto; R. at 34-57).
P.

On January 14,2000, the trial court issued a written opinion concerning PWA's

Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, in the form of a Minute Entry. The trial court dismissed
CFFs claims for specific performance and ordered the release of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
The trial court, however, did not dismiss CFFs remaining claims for breach of contract. (See
Minute Entry, Addendum "F" hereto; R. at 423-26).
R.

On February 28, 2000, in accordance with its Minute Entry, the trial court

entered an Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title. (See Order on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, Addendum "G" hereto; R. at 461-63).
U.

On March 9, 2000, because the trial court did not dismiss all of CFFs claims,

PWA filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Motion to Compel") pursuant to the Arbitration
Clause, seeking an order compelling CFI to arbitrate its remaining claims. (See R. at 483-98).
V.

On March 22, 2000, CFI filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to

Compel, arguing that PWA had waived its right to pursue arbitration. (See R. at 513-528).
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W.

On April 3,2000, PWA filed a reply memorandum explaining in detail why its

actions in this case did not constitute a waiver of its right to arbitration. (See R. at 530-42).
X.

On May 17, 2000, the trial court held a hearing on PWA's Motion to Compel.

At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied the Motion to Compel as follows:
I think there is a policy and it's continuing to evolve to favor
arbitration agreements, and I think the Courts where they can, do
compel arbitration. I think because one, it's a more rapid remedy;
one [sic], it's agreed upon between the parties; and perhaps - 1 hope
that's not my motivation - is because it relieves the Court's docket
somewhat. Nevertheless, people have a right to their day in Court,
unless there is a clear arbitration alternative.
Now, the waiver argument, there is [sic] certainly actions by the
defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration. On the other
hand, there were actions that were consistent. I am not persuaded
that waiver applies in this case, but that doesn't resolve the issue for
me, because before a Court should order arbitration, I think it needs
to be persuaded that arbitration is a bonafide option.
As I look at this case as carefully as I can, I look at the arbitration
provision. I think it was appropriately used by the defendants and
relied upon by the Court to some extent in ruling on the lis pendens
and the other issues in January to determine that in fact there was
any - it was evident of the intent of the parties to not impede the
project. I think that's clear, but the more I look at that provision, I
think it's not even an arbitration provision. In any event, if I was to
refer this matter or compel arbitration, I think I would be
compelling plaintiffs to go into a forum where they are almost
doomed to no remedy, nothing more than to be back where they
were before, and I don't think that's an appropriate use of the
arbitration mechanism. I'm denying the motion.
(See Hearing Transcript, Addendum "H" hereto; R. at 762-63).
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Y.

The trial court's Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration was

entered on May 25, 2000. (See Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration,
Addendum "I" hereto; R. at 549-50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred by denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The

Arbitration Clause reflects the parties' unmistakable intent to arbitrate any disputes
concerning the Purchase Contract. The first sentence of the Arbitration Clause plainly states
that "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed
upon by both Buyer and Seller." (R. at 30) (emphasis added). Moreover, the parties included
the Arbitration Clause in the Contract Addendum to replace the boilerplate dispute resolution
clause that otherwise would have permitted litigation. The parties agreed to arbitrate any
disputes in order to avoid delays in the development of the Property. Their overriding
objective was to complete the development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. The trial court
improperly focused on the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause, and, as a result, failed
to give effect to the parties' intention to arbitrate their disputes. The trial court disregarded
basic and controlling principles of contract interpretation.
CFI may argue that PWA waived its right to arbitrate this dispute. That argument fails.
Upon service of CFI's Complaint and receipt of CFI's Notice of Lis Pendens, PWA
immediately notified CFI that it had violated the Arbitration Clause by initiating litigation.
PWA requested CFI to dismiss the Complaint and release the Notice of Lis Pendens. CFI
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refused. Thus, to remove the Notice of Lis Pendens and protect its legal interests, PWA
simultaneously filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, and an Answer and Counterclaim.
Both pleadings referenced the Arbitration Clause and asserted that this matter should be
arbitrated, not litigated. Nine days after the trial court entered its order on the Motion to
Dismiss and Quiet Title (which dismissed some but not all of CFFs claims), PWA formally
moved the court for an order compelling arbitration. In short, PWA did not participate in this
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.

Moreover, CFI cannot

demonstrate that it has been unduly prejudiced by PWA's participation in this litigation.
Hence, under the standards set forth in Chandlery. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d
356 (Utah 1992), PWA has not waived its right to arbitration.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE, AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO COMPEL CFI TO ARBITRATE
ITS DISPUTE WITH PWA.
"[Arbitration agreements are favored in Utah." Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359

(Utah 1996). It is this Court's "policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that favors
arbitration;' Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Bradv Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah
1986). By statute, if an agreement to arbitrate exists, a court is required to order the parties
to arbitrate upon proper motion. The Utah Arbitration Act states: "The court, upon motion
of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999) (emphasis added).

UT_DOCS_A 1061346 v 4

-11-

Here, the Arbitration Clause represents an enforceable arbitration agreement. It is
contained in the Contract Addendum, which the parties negotiated at arms-length in
connection with a sophisticated transaction. The first sentence of the Arbitration Clause
unambiguously requires the parties to arbitrate their disputes. It states: "Any disagreement
over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer
and Seller." (R. at 30) (emphasis added). This provision could not have set forth more
plainly the parties' intention to arbitrate disputes over the terms of the Purchase Contract.
In denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration, however, the trial court fixated on
the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause, which states: "If agreement cannot be reached
within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process, Buyer shall receive its money
back and this agreement shall be null and void." (R. at 30). This provision sets forth the
stipulated remedy to be ordered by the arbitrators if the parties cannot reach an agreement
within 60 days after arbitration begins. The trial court, however, erroneously construed this
language to defeat the parties' clear intention, embodied in the first sentence of the Arbitration
Clause, to arbitrate their disputes.
The hearing transcript reveals that the trial court denied arbitration because it was
uncomfortable with the potential result of the arbitration process. The trial court stated: "[I]f
I was to refer this matter or compel arbitration, I think I would be compelling plaintiffs to go
into a forum where they are almost doomed to no remedy, nothing more than to be back
where they were before." (R. at 763, Addendum "G" hereto). As explained below, it was
improper for the trial court to deny arbitration simply because it disapproved of the remedy
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bargained for by the parties. The trial court, in essence, attempted to re-write the parties'
contract. The trial court's decision does not comport with fundamental principles of contract
interpretation, nor with sound policies favoring arbitration.
A.

The Trial Court's Decision Violated Established Principles of Contract
Interpretation By Failing to Give Effect to the Parties' Express Intentions.

The trial court's refusal to compel arbitration violates cardinal rules of contract
interpretation.

The Arbitration Clause, as with other contractual provisions, must be

interpreted in accordance with the parties' intentions. See Reed v. Davis County School DisU
892 P.2d 1063, 1064-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Where the language employed is clear and
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of that language.
See id. at 1065. Here, not only is the language of the Arbitration Clause unambiguous, but
it was included to replace the standard dispute resolution clause that otherwise would have
permitted litigation. This demonstrates an unmistakable intent to arbitrate rather than litigate
disputes concerning the terms of the Purchase Contract.
The parties specifically chose not to use the standard-form language in the body of the
Purchase Contract regarding dispute resolution, which would have required them first to
submit disputes to mediation before proceeding with litigation. (See Purchase Contract ^J15,
Addendum "A" hereto; R. at 28). By negotiating and executing the Contract Addendum,
however, the parties modified certain provisions in the Purchase Contract, including the
standard dispute resolution clause. The Contract Addendum explains: "To the extent the
terms of this Addendum modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC,... these terms
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shall control." (R. at 26, Addendum "A" hereto). Hence, the Arbitration Clause (in
Paragraph 12 of the Contract Addendum), providing that "[a]ny disagreement over the terms
of this agreement shall be arbitrated," superseded the standard dispute resolution clause in the
body of the Purchase Contract. The parties' replacement of the standard clause with the
Arbitration Clause provides strong evidence of their intent to arbitrate disputes under the
Purchase Contract.
The affidavits submitted to the trial court in connection with PWA's Motion to Compel
Arbitration provide further evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate any disputes under the
Purchase Contract. The Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III, states:
As a further condition of the Purchase Contract, the partners of
PWA expressly negotiated a provision to avoid future litigation
at all costs. In particular, Addendum No. 1 modified the
Purchase Contract to provide that any disagreement over the
terms 'shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer
and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from
the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its
money back and this agreement shall be null and void.' The
purpose of including this provision was to avoid the very
litigation PWA finds itself involved in presently and because of
the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. Any delay would be
crippling to the development of the Property.
(Plumb Aff. % 7, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 157). Even the Affidavit of David A. Siegel,
a principal of CFI, indicates CFI's desire to avoid delays in its purchase and construction of
the Property to ensure that the time-share units would be completed by the 2002 Winter
Olympics. (See Affidavit of David A. Seigel at ^ 7; R. at 269-76). Simply put, the parties
desired to avoid litigation at all costs, and therefore agreed to arbitrate any disputes under the
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Purchase Contract. Their intentions in this respect were unequivocal. The trial court erred
in declining to compel arbitration.
B.

The Trial Court Failed to Harmonize Both Sentences of the Arbitration
Clause and Disregarded the Parties' Right to Define Their Arbitration
Process and the Arbitrators5 Authority.

It is a fundamental principle of contract interpretation that courts should give effect to
the parties' intentions by harmonizing "all of [the contract's] provisions and all of its terms,
and all of its terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Ass'n v. Baglev & Co.. 928 P.2d 1047,1053 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). cert, denied.
937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997); see also Armiio v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 72 F.3d 793, 799 (10th Cir.
1995) (affirming decision to compel arbitration and explaining that, whenever possible, courts
should "interpret one provision so as to avoid negating another").
The first and second sentences of the Arbitration Clause can both be given effect and
harmonized. The first sentence, "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall
be arbitrated," manifests an unambiguous intention to arbitrate disputes. The second sentence,
"[i]f agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process,
Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void," sets forth the
remedy to be ordered by the arbitrators if an agreement is not reached within 60 days after
arbitration begins.
This is the only reasonable construction of the Arbitration Clause. It gives meaning
to the second sentence without negating the clear intent of the first sentence. It also comports
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with the Utah Arbitration Act, which authorizes parties to impose a time period within which
an arbitration award must be made. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-10 ("An arbitration award
shall be made within the time set by the agreement"). Moreover, it represents a proper
exercise of the parties' right to agree to a specific dispute resolution process, and to define the
scope of the arbitrators' authority. See, e.g.. City and County of Denver v. District Court, 939
P.2d 1353, 1361 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) ("The right of parties to contract encompasses the
correlative power to agree to a specific ADR [Alternative Dispute Resolution] procedure for
resolving disputes"); In re Clawson, 783 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Hawaii 1989) ("The scope of an
arbitrator's authority is determined by agreement of the parties."); Board of Education v.
Ewig, 609 P.2d 10,12 (Alaska 1980) ("In the absence of statutory restrictions, parties are free
to contract for the terms of arbitration they desire.").
Given the time-sensitive nature of the development of the Property, it made sense for
the parties to agree to such a dispute resolution process, one that was confined in duration,
avoided litigation, and provided a default remedy restoring the parties to the status quo ante
if agreement could not be reached. Under the Arbitration Clause, inasmuch as the parties
retain the ultimate discretion to reach an agreement, the arbitrators act as decision-makers on
all other matters pursuant to the powers conferred upon them by the Utah Arbitration Act and
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. For instance, they may "administer oaths
and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, records,
documents, and other evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-8(l) (1999). They may also order
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"a party to provide [the] other party with information which is determined by the arbitrator
to be relevant/' or require "discovery as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [and
determine the response time to the discovery requests]." Id. § 78-3 la-8(2); see also Rules R23, R-32 and R-33 of the American Arbitration Association (R. at 603-05). If agreement is
not reached within 60 days of good-faith efforts,2 the arbitrators must order PWA to return
CFI's earnest money deposit, and declare the Purchase Contract null and void.3
This arbitration process is the remedy which the parties negotiated, and the Purchase
Contract requires that this remedy be enforced. The Purchase Contract states: "Where a
Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall
be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law."
(See Purchase Contract Tf 16; R. at 28). Because this provision is not in conflict with or
superseded by any provision in the Contract Addendum, it controls, and it operates to give full
force and effect to the terms of the Arbitration Clause. The parties' contractual remedy
should be enforced, especially when CFFs only remaining claims against PWA are for alleged
breaches of the terms of the Purchase Contract itself.

If a disagreement between the parties had arisen during the period in which the
Purchase Contract obligations were supposed to be performed, from June 14, 1998,
to December 31, 1998, there potentially, but not necessarily, would have been an
increased incentive for the parties to reach an agreement in the arbitration process.
One may argue that this arbitration process resembles binding mediation. Regardless
of the label given, it is clear that the parties intended to bind themselves to a method
of alternative dispute resolution that resolved disagreements out of court, in a short
period of time, with the default remedy to apply absent an agreement.
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Notably, at the time the Arbitration Clause was executed, any number of events could
have occurred to give rise to a dispute under the Purchase Contract. The agreed-upon
arbitration process and default remedy could have worked to the advantage or disadvantage
of either party. As it turns out, under the events that transpired, CFI now seeks to avoid this
arbitration process entirely. CFI, however, should not be allowed to escape its bargain. It was
improper for the trial court to alter or amend the agreement which the parties made for
themselves.4 See Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co. Inc., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)
(explaining, based on freedom of contract principles, that unambiguous contracts should be
enforced as written).
C.

The First Sentence of the Arbitration Clause is Controlling, Even If It is
Not Harmonized With the Second Sentence.

To the extent the first and second sentences of the Arbitration Clause are in conflict
and cannot be harmonized, the first sentence should be given greater weight. Its meaning is
clear. In addition, as a general principle of contract interpretation, specific terms are given
greater weight than general language. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 2d § 203 (c)
(1979) ("specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language"). The
first sentence uses the term "arbitration," which has specific and independent legal
significance. See Reed v. Davis County School Dist., 892 P.2d at 1065 (holding arbitration
4

Alternatively, the trial court could have ordered the parties to commence arbitration
pursuant to the first sentence of the Arbitration Clause, and let the arbitrators
determine the meaning and/or enforceability of the second sentence. After all, the
first sentence of the Arbitration Clause calls for disputes over the terms of the
agreement to be arbitrated.
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agreement did not exist because words "arbitration" or "arbitrate" did not appear). Thus, the
parties's use of the term in the Arbitration Clause carries persuasive weight, especially in
context of the mandatory nature of the phrase "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this
agreement shall be arbitrated." See Scher v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 723 F.Supp. 211,216
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (compelling arbitration by giving greater weight to first sentence of
arbitration clause, which stated that controversies "shall be settled by arbitration," as opposed
to second sentence of clause, which could have been construed to permit litigation). The trial
court erred by construing the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause to defeat the plain
meaning of the first sentence.
In short, the parties' intent to arbitrate is evidenced by (i) the plain language of the
Arbitration Clause, (ii) the parties' replacement of the standard dispute resolution clause with
the Arbitration Clause, and (iii) the affidavits submitted to the trial court in connection with
the Motion to Compel Arbitration. By denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration, the
trial court failed to give effect to the parties' intentions, failed to harmonize both sentences
of the Arbitration Clause, and violated other fundamental principles of contract interpretation.
II

PWA DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION.
CFI's principal argument in response to PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration was that

PWA had waived its right to seek arbitration under the standards set forth in Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992). Although the trial court did not deny
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PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration on that basis, (see R. at 762-63, Addendum "G"
hereto), CFI may nevertheless attempt to make that argument again before this Court.5
In Chandler, the Court established the two-pronged standard for determining whether
a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration: "[W]aiver . . . must be based on both [i]
a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and
[ii] a finding of prejudice." 833 P.2d at 360. Neither prong is satisfied in this case.
First, as set forth in the "Statement of Facts" above, PWA did not participate in
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. CFI filed this action on November
9, 1999. CFI recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against the Property on the same date. Three
days later, PWA notified CFI by letter that filing this action violated the Arbitration Clause.
(See R. at 17-19). PWA requested that CFI immediately dismiss its Complaint and release
the Notice of Lis Pendens. (See id.). When CFI refused to do so, PWA was forced to protect
its legal interests by simultaneously filing (i) a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, requesting
an order dismissing the claims against PWA and ordering the release of the Notice of Lis
Pendens, and (ii) an Answer and Counterclaim. (See R. at 34-115).
Given the time-sensitive nature of the development of PWA's property and The
Canyons SPA, PWA had to resort to a court of law to obtain an order requiring the release of
5

The standard of review for whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate is different
from the standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. As
explained in Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^|16, 982 P.2d 572, the actions or
events allegedly supporting waiver are reviewed as factual determinations, for which
a trial court is accorded deference. Thus, to the extent CFI argues that PWA waived
its right to arbitrate, CFI must overcome a higher standard of review.
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the Notice ofLis Pendens, which threatened to hold up the development of the entire Canyons
SPA. Furthermore, both the Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title and the Answer and
Counterclaim specifically referred to the Arbitration Clause. The Motion to Dismiss and
Quiet Title asserted that "in the event this court denies PWA's Motion to Dismiss, at the very
least, the Court should enter an order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration
in accordance with [Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration]." (See R. at 102, Addendum "E"
hereto).

The Answer and Counterclaim quoted the Arbitration Clause verbatim and

referenced the letter of November 12, 1999, stating that initiating this action was not
permitted under the Arbitration Clause. (See R. at 40-41, 47; Addendum "D" hereto).
The trial court granted PWA's Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title on January 14,2000,
which ruling was later reduced to a formal Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet
Title, entered February 28, 2000. Although that Order required CFI to release the Notice of
Lis Pendens, it did not dismiss all of CFI's claims. Accordingly, only nine (9) days later, on
March 9, 2000, PWA formally moved the trial court to compel arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Clause. (See R. at 483-98). These facts show that PWA has not participated in
this action in a manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate.
In addition, CFI cannot demonstrate that it has been unduly prejudiced by PWA's
participation in this litigation. As explained in Chandler, "the prejudice must result from the
delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not from factors that are inherent in arbitration
itself." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. Inasmuch as there was no delay in PWA's assertion of the
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right to arbitrate, there can be no prejudice resulting from a delay. Furthermore, PWA has not
obtained any advantages in this litigation that could be unfairly used against CFI in the
arbitration. There is simply no basis for a finding of prejudice. PWA therefore did not waive
its right to arbitrate this dispute in accordance with the Arbitration Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Arbitration Clause reflects the parties' clear intent to avoid litigation, at all costs,
to minimize any disruption to, or delay in, the development of the Property. The trial court's
decision failed to give effect to the parties' intention. PWA therefore requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and remand with
instructions that an order compelling arbitration be entered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J&%y

of November, 2000.

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord
'
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Park West Associates
and Beaver Creek Associates
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C.4 Resolution of Buyers objections under Section tj

shall be m wriung and ihall become part of this

Cantrtct.

P£CIAI- CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made rubjee: to:

.1 sallar to provida buyar with all enginaariag data regarding tha Property at
llara axpan-a<*.
9 . 2 S a l l a r t o provida Buyar w i t h Xastar Plan and i n i t i a l b u i l d i n g d e s i g n , w i t h input
om buyar , f o r tha P r o p a r t y , a t a a l l a r a axpanaa, .
9.3 B a l l a r t o p r o v i d a Buyar w i t h a l l nacaaa&ry govammantal approvals rawarding y***~~*P4Pr{
oparty i n c l u d i n g Haatar Plan approval, at s a l l a r s axnenaa- ^A< C<^r*)\S**>
fct^^
4^^"
9.4 A "paopla movar* that i a accaptabla t o buyar y ^ h i l Y ^ e daaignadPoad I n a t a l l a d to
;a / a n t a r of t h a p r o p e r t y , a t no axpanaa to tha buyar, on or bafora 1 2 / 1 / 9 8.
9f;5^^all«r aha-11 guaran*4ia t h a t £1A. 000 l a ^ : . w i l l >fia\ approM*** for davelpMiaprtNon
Uyvropa^ty^/Buy^r, a a / i t A a o l a ^ a e ^ r a t i o y T ha* t h a / a h i M t y y i o li^a^TaasciniiuL^f
1,000 aovTSr. of t 3 a ^ 6 t a l Si^JWO a q > f ^ / a a coaiaiaa/cial ep«*e?a.
9 . 6 Buy or l a reaponaihla for a l l of tha watar aharaa and/or connaction-s, on tha aasna
l a i a aa tha a a l l a r and athor davalopare i n v o l v e d w i t h i n tha Canyoua Haatar P l a n .
9.7 S a l l a r a h d l l apply f o r , w i t h input from buyar, and o b t a i n Final Kaatar Plan
*>xT\^f
pproval, a t a a l l a r a mx?****. on or bafora J u l / 1, 1JJB. rvtygk* ?>t x &TZ
Q~fZ-/
gjtfJ
9 . 8 This t r a a a a c t i o u a h a l l c l o a a on tha a a r l i a r of 12/31/93 or IS days a f t a x ^ n a l
aater- P l * n a p p r o v a l .
(j
9.9 S a t i r a agraamant i a aubjact to Summit County Approval of d a n a i t y , zoning and
ea.
he terms of attached Addendum 3 _ _

L ire incorporated into this Canrract by this reference.

5. S E I X K ' S LIMITED WAJUCOTTIES. Zdltfi

wnmnuea to Buyer regarding the Property are limited GO uSe following:

10.2 When Seller delivers possescioa of the Property to Buyer, K will be broom-dtao tnd free of debni and personal belongings:
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with Che phmfcifl*, plumbed futures, heating, cooiing. ventilating electrical and sprinkler (indoor
ml outdoor) ryrprms, appliances, and HrcpUces in working order;
10J Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Bayer with (he roof tnd foundation (rem of leaks known to Seller:
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Prvperqr «o Buyer with any privue well or acpuc tank serving the Property in working order nod in compliance *ith
;ovemmenul

regulao'ons;

10J Selicr wiJI be responsible for lepaoing any of Seller's moving-relited damage to ihe Property;
t0.6 A( Cosing, Sdler will bring currtm all fuianciel obligau'ooi encumbering the Property whieh are assumed m writing by Buyer and will discharge ill such
jbltgauona which Buyer has noc so assamad;
10.7 As of Oosiag. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of aa environmentai. bvilding. or zoning code violation regarding the Property
w

wltich lias

been resolved.

II. VERIFICATION OF WARRA«VTED A/^O uNCLlfDfD ITEMS

Ailer all eontlngcnces have been removed and before doting

the Cuyer may conduct

I "walk-through" inspection of the Property ks determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1. 10Li. 10.3 and 10.4

are in the warranted

condition 2nd to verify that items included in Section / . / a r e presaatiy on the Property. If any item Is no* in die warranted condition, Seller will corract, repair
or replace it as neaaasary or, with tha consent of Buyer and (if required) Lender, escrow a* wnoun* tt Gosiag M provide for such repair or replacement. The
Flayer's failure to conduct a Nmlk-oVough* iaapeetian or » claim during the Sraik-through* inspection thai the Property does noc include all items referenced
in &crfo« / . / or \M not m the condition warranted ia SrcfVo* 10, shad conslitUM a waiver of Buyer's righli under Section / . / a n d of the warranties conuincd in
Section 10.
I I CltANCZS OCJRING TSKAKSACT70N.

Seller a^tea thai no changes in any existing leases thal\ be made, oo new leases entered into, and oo substantial

alterations or (tnprqvejncnu us tha Prtoarry ihai) be underuicen without the written consent of the Buyer.
13. A i m i O R T T Y OF SIGNERS, (f Buyer or Seller ia a corporation, partnership, mast, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf war.
rants Ms or >Ser authority Go ao so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in taierot to Buyer or Seller. If the Seller is noi cne vested Owner of the
Property but has control over the vested Owners disposition of the Property, the Setter io*ea la exercise this contra! and deliver tide under this Caozraet as h'
ti had been signed by the vested Owner.
14. COMPLETE COrTntACT. This iiuortirnent (termer with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller DUdarurta ) consdiuies the enure Contrsct

tea! Estate Purchase Contract
luverfal fffjQj
taa^AjTSwrnaTBoa: 47QQ, Fnaca. CO 8044X Varslon 5.5. CHeaiFArra), 19M: f^o* PUTUAR225425
:omc<aiec ay - oVent A Femn% Pnnc«oa4 Brokar, Caer Qeal Realty
06712/98 03:17:49
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iS IS AM EL ADDENDUM
la of JUPQ,yTU—H2A

_
SS?

ADDENDUM NO. i_
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

U COUNTEROFFER to mat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CCKTR\CT ((he "REPC*} wfCi an Offer Reference
, Including atf prior addenda and counteroffers, between

Central Florida Investments, l a c .
8uyer, and
Par3cw«at A a a o c i a t a a and B e a v e r Creak A s s o c i a t e d
Sailer, regarding me Property located at
. ' o s t v o o d P a r c e l * l o c a t e d a t t h e b a a a o f "The C a n y o n a - s k i a r a a .
te following lorma are haraby incorporated as part 0/ !he REPC:

\

.
.
..
i.
'.
J,
/ /
'

y/
jj

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

^

~

^

This offer supercedes tha Raal Bstate Purchase Contract dated April 22, 1998.
Buyer shall purchase approximately 20 ecraa aa prepared by Seller's Architect in
Exhibit •A", attached hereto and made a past thereof.
Tha Proparty shall ba conveyed by Opd^II^iCTrranty Un^d,
Seller aha.ll provide Standard Owners Policy at Seller'a expense.
Sailer s h a l l provida a copy of tha survey prepared by Bush a Cuedgell.
Buyer sha.ll submit Buyer4a plan to Summit Cotmty simuitaneoualy with Sailer 1 a
submittal.
Tha plan shall Include architecture for a 400 unit tinaahaxe projact.
The dealcm,yx^j»pcation of tha "People Hover* zmiat be acceptable to the Canyona
Resort/^iw i a i c i l i a t i o a tad coat to be approved by. Seller.
Buyer understand* and acreea to tha following]
.-a) Summit County has atated that i t s preferred development i s timeshare, interval
ownership, or hotel/motel.
b) S e l l e r , on i t s Master Plan, has an additional 257 unite of who la ownership
including €2 residential lot*, which a hall remain such after Buyer's County
approvals are received.
j^rmw^ f rvmnfcy^ttad the Canyons^ hava^ indicated an overall square foot parameter
of approximately -aSO, 000 te g S&, ftSO square feet.
d> I t nay be neceaaary to obtain frost Summit County a waiver for tha additional
square footage in the timeehara portion neceasary for Buyers required unite.
rs £a) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this contract may be
*^~yt
cancelled in writing by either Buyer or f e l l e r .
£vt*A
&<Lt^*\v^^
This tranaaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days aftery approval^ of Buyer's
tijaeshare project or December 31, 1599,
' '
The release prise of either aquare footage or acreage ehall be at 120% of par.
All acres shall he released by the Seller only, on a release schedule approved by
the S e l l e r .
Sailer shall "stub41 roads to tinaahaxe property oa three sides, which are north*
south, and eaat, at Seller'a expenae. Buyer shall construct a l l interior roads to
serve timaahare project at Buyer's mxp+as**
Any disagreement over the terras of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties
agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller.
If agreement cannot be reached within 50
days from the beginning of an arbitration procesa Buyer shall receive i t s money
bacic and this agreement shall be null and void.
Seller shall be responsible for a l l coata aasociatad with the people mover l i f t .
There shall be no interest on the unpaid balance owed to Seller.

**P$3
&^

rHIS FORM APPROVED 8YTHE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMIttSStOM AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GEKERAU EFFECTIVE JUNE 12.199S. IT
^
XJ
REPLACES AHO SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM,
"^
^ddeadum » Real Estate Purcftaee Contract
ReaiFATlWorfro. 8ox 4700. F f t o . CO 80444, Venion 1 5 , ORaaiFAJTS). 199S: Reg* PUTUAA225436
Cattiotoeo &y - Sre<i< A. Fernn. Prwooai Soaker. Deer On« Reatty
06712/9* 03:11-10
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The tnnaaction shall constitute 5 aeparata cloainga asaociatad with each release
far purposes of allowing the Seller 5 aeparata 1031 tax deferred exchanges. Each
closing Jhe.ll be paid in caah with en additional 20H b«ing peid as a down payment
for tha GAJCC echedulad cloaing. See belowt
$2,450,000 Due at cloaing
$500,000
$2,550,000 Release 122,000 sq.ft.

/ Prepayment
/ lat Payment
Xear 3 PeyrminL
Prepayment
2nd Paymane

\

** *

92,500,000 Due on lat yr anniversary
$500,000
$3,000,000 Release 122,000 aq.ft.

Prepayment
3rd Payment

$2,500,000 Due on 2nd yr anniversary
$500,000
$3,000,000 Solaaee 122,000 sq.ft.

Prepayment'
4fch Payment

$2,500,000 Due on 3rd yr anniversary
$500,000
$3,000,000 Release 122,000 sq.ft.

Year
'f jflayent
roar *?
p?y—^**

\

'

$3,000,000 du« on 4th yr anniversary
Release 122,000 e q - f t A ^ r-eik<2£S*

•,

.

j

me extent ihe terms of this ADOENOUM modify or conflict *rfth any provrs/ona of the REPC. Including ail prior addenda and counteroffers, ihcse
ms srtart control. All o<her terms of the REPC. tacfudJngpncr addenda and counteroffers, not modified by mis ADDENDUM rtatf remain the same.
Seller SJ Buyer snail have until 5 J U M
O A J J . E3 PJyL Mountain Time June I S . m f l
3 0 ^ ^ tan^ ^ ^
to
JOENOUM in acccrdanca withy^^provb^a of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless ao accepted, the offer as set forth In this AOOENOUM

^ Buyer

LJ Seller Signature

Date

Time

L-J Buyer D Seller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/REJECnON/COUNTER OFFER
a

^ COUNTEROFFER:

Signature) fl j it/

Seller UU Bj^er hereby accsota the terms of (his ADOENOUM,
Setter
DSeder •-» Buyer presents aa a counter offer the terms setforthon the attached AOOENOUM NO.

///

>4

.

- < 0ato >

3 REJECTION: C3 SeOer <-* Buyarmjects the (
Signature)

(Oele)

n/a

#

(Signature)

(Oate)

fTime)

(Signature)

(Oate)

(Time)

ADDENDUM.
(Time)

1$ FORM APPROVED 6 Y THC UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GEHERAL, EFFECTIVE JUNE 12.1SSS. IT
PLACES ANO SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

d**dum to (U*i Estate Purchase Cantrsct
ft?)
atFAST€0^o?ms. Sox 4700, Frisco, CO 8Q443* Version 5.S. ORaa^AJT^, 199S: Rac,* PUTUAR225436
mptetae dy«9mnt A. f^mn. Prrnoosd Bnsfcer. Oeer Cms* Raafty
08/12*8 0*23:20

(V/V/
frt@

Setoffs) \\¥.
p*Qt2of:

TabB

FITTLT
DEC 1 3 1999
^

Mark R. Gaylord (#5073)
Craig H. Howe (#7552)

Third patriot Court

~u«puty Clerk. Summit Counfy '

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 1200
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2215
Telephone: (801) 531-3000
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., ;
) AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER J.
;) PLUMB, III

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

]
1

Civil No. 990600361CR

])

Judge Pat Brian

)
ss:
)

Walter J. Plumb, III, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.
forth herein.

C X

I am over the age of twenty-one (21) and have personal knowledge of the matters set

2.

I am a general partner of Park West Associates, a Utah general partnership

(hereinafter referred to as TWA"). I am also the secretary of the Madison Company, a Utah
corporation, which is the general partner of Beaver Creek Associates, a Utah limited partnership.
I shall collectively refer to Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates as TWA."
3.

I have reviewed the Complaint filed in the above-referenced action and the lis

pendens recorded in connection with the lawsuit, which has been recorded in violation of my
understanding of that certain Real Estate Purchase Agreement, executed between PWA and Central
Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI") on or about June 14,1998 (the "Purchase Contract"), a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference.
4.

Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel

within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (the "Property") for the purchase price of
$ 15,000,000. At the time, the Frostwood Development consisted of approximately seventy-five (75)
acres, which included the twenty-acre parcel subject to the Purchase Contract.1 Pursuant to the
Purchase Contract, CFI was to purchase the Property by making a $50,000 earnest money deposit,
paying $2,950,000 cash at the time of closing, and financing the balance of $12,500,000 over four
(4) years.
5.

The Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by members of the Utah

Association of Realtors, but was expressly "subject to" certain "Special Contingencies." I
understood that closing had to occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan
approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning

The seventy-five acre parcel shall be referred to hereinafter as the "Frostwood Property."
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and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction." In the
event any one of these special contingencies did not occur, I understood the Purchase Contract would
be terminated and PWA would no longer be obligated to sell the Property to CFI.
6.

Concurrent with the execution of the Purchase Contract, PWA also executed an

addendum ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part of Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference. Addendum No. 1 amended and modified the Special
Contingencies and further refined the conditions precedent to closing. In particular, it was my
understanding that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of
obtaining Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that the "Buyer
shall submit Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related
development within the same area]." It was my understanding that the Buyer's plan would include
architecture for a 400 unit timeshare project. In other words, CFI accepted full responsibility for
satisfying the contingency of obtaining Summit County's approval of its timeshare project. It was
further understood and agreed that the following additional terms contained in paragraphs 8 and 9
of Addendum No.l modified the Purchase Contract:
8.a)
Summit County has stated that its preferred development is
timeshare, interval ownership, or hotel/motel;
b)
Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of
whole ownership including 63 residential lots, which shall remain
such after Buyer's County approvals are received;
c)
Summit County and The Canyons have indicated an overall
square foot parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet;
d)
It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver
for the additional square footage in the timeshare portion necessary
for Buyers required units; and
e)
If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this
contract may be canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller.

UT_DOCS_A 1030376 v 1
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9.
This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after
final approval by County of Buyer's timeshare project or
December 31,1998.
(Emphasis added.) In summary, it was my understanding that the Purchase Contract, as a condition
to closing, required final Summit County approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525
square feet each or 610,000 total square feet, 257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury
single family homes with a contemplated average of 4,000 square feet and 195 multi-family units
with an average of 2000 square feet for a total of 638,000 square feet.
7.

As a further condition of the Purchase Contract, the partners of PWA expressly

negotiated a provision to avoid future litigation at all costs. In particular, Addendum No. 1 modified
the Purchase Contract to provide that any disagreement over the its terms "shall be arbitrated by
parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from
the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall
be null and void." The purpose of including this provision was to avoid the very litigation PWA
finds itself involved in presently and because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. Any
delay would be crippling to the development of the Property.
8.

Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms of this

ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including all prior
addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control/'
9.

In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, on June

25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the Property:
a.

UT_DOCSwA 1030376 v 1
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10.

b.

Topo Survey;

c.

Documentation of Recent Impact Fees;

d.

Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and

e.

Owners Agreement.

By September 2,1998, in addition to the foregoing items, PWA delivered to CFI the

Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's
Preliminary Title Report and Seller's Property Disclosure.
11.

In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for CFI's

twenty-acre proposed time share project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever
submitted to me or anyone else associated with PWA.
12.

Because of CFI's failure to meet established deadlines, including its failure to submit

a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998,
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was
no longer valid. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of the memorandum from Ms. Crosby and
Mr. Coleman to CFI, dated November 12, 1998.
13.

In early December, 1998,1 attended a meeting between CFI and PWA. Those present

included, among others, Richard E. Frost, Marion Crosby (via telephone), Steven Peterson, Brent
Ferrin, Ron Ferrin, Jim Fogg, David Seigel and an attorney representing Mr. Seigel. During the
meeting, it was expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in
the Purchase Contract had not been met and could not be met by December 31,1998 and that if CFI
wanted to avoid terminating the Purchase Contract, anew purchase contract and/or addendum would

UT_DOCS_A 1030376 v 1
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need to be entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31,1998. However, no agreement
was reached to either extend the Purchase Contract or revise its terms.
14.

On December 17, 1998, CFI wrote a letter to Dick Frost, as general partner of PWA,

with a copy to me, to explain why it believed the Purchase Contract remained in full force and effect.
A copy of the December 17, 1998 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "C."
15.

When December 31, 1998 came and went without Summit County's providing

approval of PWA's plan's for the entire Frostwood Property and/or CFFs timeshare project, it was
my understanding and the understanding of PWA that the Purchase Contract terminated and that
PWA was free to deal with the Property as it saw was in its own best interest.
16.

In the early part of 1999, CFI attempted to reinstate the Purchase Contract by

presenting several proposals to amend. At no time did I or anyone else working for or on behalf of
PWA agree to reinstate the Purchase Contract.
17.

With the termination of the Purchase Contract, the other partners of PWA and I

moved forward with efforts to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development
being planned for the surrounding area of The Canyons Ski Resort.
a.

In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property owners

about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of The Canyons Specially Planned Area Plan (the
"First SPA Plan") adopted by Summit County on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a group of
property owners: namely, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah, Inc., Iron
Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain Resort, L,C, C&M Properties, and Groutage.
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Negotiations over amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the
summer of 1999.
b.

After expressing an interest, I executed a "Non-binding Statement of

Acknowledgment" on behalf of PWA whereby we committed to being included in a proposed
amendment to the First SPA Plan.
c.

On several occasions, I spoke with representatives of CFI and informed them

of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA Plan.
18.

Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing throughout November, I

participated extensively with the adjacent property owners to secure approval from Summit County
of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that process, I participated in numerous meetings
with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's demand that an
18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became apparent that this
was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA Plan.
19.

Since January of this year alone, PWA has incurred expenses relating to obtaining

approval of the amendment to the First SPA Plan in excess of $100,000.
20.

On November 15, 1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified and

approved the amendment to the First SPA Plan (the "The Canyons SPA"). PWA had previously
executed The Canyons SPA, on November 8, 1999, which contemplates the development of a
master-planned resort community (the "Project") for The Canyons on over 7,000 acres of land in
Summit County. The Canyons SPA allocated to the Frostwood Project and PWA 857,000 square
feet, including approximately 40,000 square feet of commercial space. PWA was also obligated to
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deed 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres to Summit County, further reducing the
development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA.
21.

The approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood Property is located within the Project

and, in particular, "The Canyons Resort Center." The Frostwood Property's periphery is to be used
primarily for open space, including the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf course.
22.

Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject to

strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development
of the Project.
23.

Under the terms of The Canyons SPA, the Project is to be phased in by expansion

outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood Property. For this reason,
construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in developing the Resort Core
and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property.
24.

Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which will be partially

situated on Frostwood property, is one of the two highest priorities in the Project. Indeed, section
3.2.6 of The Canyons SPA requires, in part, that the parties "ensure that the course is completed
within 36 months" of November 15, 1999. Failure to meet this deadline could cause a revocation
of all development entitlements of all participants of The Canyons SPA, including PWA.
25.

Because of the lis pendens recorded against the Frostwood property, the timely

development and completion of the entire golf course has been placed in jeopardy.
26.

CFI's action is threatening the successful completion of The Canyons SPA

development entirely, including the golf course, and the lis pendens will cause irreparable harm to

UT DOCS A 1030376 v 1

8

both PWA, as an owner of property subject to The Canyons SPA, and The Canyons SPA
development itself if not released immediately. This is particularly so, considering the 2002
Olympics are coming and, therefore, time is of the essence.
27.

As of today's date, CFI breached the Purchase Contract by failing, refusing and

neglecting to dismiss the complaint or release the lis pendens.
DATED this ? ^ day of December 1999.

Walter J. Plumb, III
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On this 6
day of December, 1999, before me, the undersigned notary, personally
appeared WALTER J. PLUMB, III, who is personally known to me, or has provided satisfactory
evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and who swore and affirmed
to me that the signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

i

f> M^JL,^

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: <^u^
My Commission Expires:

> . 5 - £L<-3
NOTARY PUBLIC
~£AN E. MCDONALD
1420 South Lincoln St.
S.L.C., UT 84105
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JULY 3,2003
STATE OF UTAH

Q
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WASHINGTON,

MARK R GAYLORD
OIRECT DIAL
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November 12, 1999

Via Facsimile (801) 521-9015
and Hand Delivery
Central Florida Investments, Inc.
c/o Wayne G. Petty
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Park West Associates / Frostwood Parcel

Gentlemen:
This firm represents Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively
"PWA") in connection with the matters which follow. PWA and Central Florida Investments,
Inc. ("CFI") entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract together with Addendum No. 1 thereto,
each dated June 12, 1998 ("Purchase Contract"). The Purchase Contract is the subject of this
letter.
As you are aware, PWA has consistently taken the position that the Purchase Contract
terminated on December 31, 1998, due to the fact that several special contingencies set forth in
Section 9 of the Purchase Contract were not satisfied, including among other things, Summit
County's failure to grant final approval of Buyer's timeshare project by December 31,1998.
Furthermore, the entire Purchase Contract, under special contingency 9.9, was subject to Summit
County's approval of density, zoning and use as described by the Purchase Contract This
approval did not occur by the December 31,1998 drop dead date.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the termination
provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives you written notice that
the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C,
D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum 1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood
Project would require a base density of 959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square
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footage necessary for CFI's timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that
approximately 1.2 million square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to
achieve a 400 unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet each (248,000
total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately 2,000 square feet each
(390,000 total square feet).
As of November 8, 1999, the final Spa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood Project and
PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the property deeded to Summit
County described below), of which approximately 40,000 is commercial. An additional 40,000
square feet of approved density on four acres must be deeded by PWA to Summit County,
further reducing the development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the
957,000 square feet required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional
square footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's additional
257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots.
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of allrightsunder the Purchase Contract, including
the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the Purchase Contract in accordance with
Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project
the minimum square footage established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract
Due to the termination of the Purchase Contract, the filing of the Complaint and
recording of the lis pendens was improper. Paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 expressly provides
that "any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed
upon by both Buyer and Seller." Paragraph 12 was included in the parties agreement for the
express purpose of avoiding litigation. More importantly, this paragraph supercedes and replaces
section 15 of the Purchase Agreement in that it conflicts with therightsof the parties to submit
the matter to mediation. Since the terms of the Addendum modify and conflict with section 15
the terms of Addendum No. 1 control. As such, the filing of the Complaint and recording of lis
pendens constitutes a breach of the Purchase Contract. It is also a wrongful lien that is actionable
under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1.
Section 38-9-1(6) defines a "wrongful lien" as any document that purports to create a lien
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property, and at the time it is recorded or
filed is not expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute. Although Utah
law provides an exception for lis pendens it only does so if the action is authorized. The action
filed by CFI is not authorized by statute or the Purchase Contract In fact, it is expressly
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prohibited by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1. Therefore, PWA respectfully requests that CFI
immediately dismiss the complaint and release the lis pendens. See Utah Code Ann, § 38-9-4,
Failure to do so may subject CFI to a claim for damages arising from, among other things, a
wrongful lien having been placed on the property.
Should you wish to discuss the contents of this letter, please do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord'
cc:

Walter J. Plumb, HI, Esq.
Steven D. Peterson, Esq.
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DEC 1 3 1999
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073)
Craig H. Howe (#7552)

Third District Court
By.

Dtputy Clerk, Summit Com

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 1200
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2215
Telephone: (801) 531-3000
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
) OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND
> TO QUIET TITLE

vs.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
)

Civil No. 990600361CR

1

Judge Pat Brian

Defendants.

Defendants, Park West Associates ("Park West") and Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver
Creek") (collectively "PWA"), by and through their counsel, hereby submit the following
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. For the reasons set forth below,
PWA respectfully requests that this Court enter an order dismissing the action brought by plaintiff,
Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), and canceling the notice of lis pendens recorded against
the subject property, only a portion of which is the subject of this lawsuit.

INTRODUCTION
On the eve of Summit County's approval of one of the largest development projects to be
undertaken within its jurisdiction, an expenenced and highly sophisticated Flonda corporation that
specializes in timeshare resort developments filed this action seeking specific performance of a real
estate purchase contract that terminated by its own terms over ele\ en months ago On July 14,1998,
CFI offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons"
for the purchase price of SI 5,000,000 The agreement contained several conditions precedent and
provided that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12731/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan
approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning
and use," and that time was of the essence Because Summit County never gave its approval and the
transaction did not close by December 31,1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by
its own terms on that date Therefore, this Court should dismiss this action on the grounds that CFI
cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted
Concurrent with the filing of this action, CFI recorded a lis pendens against all seventy-five
acres owned by PWA, even though the expired Purchase Contract only contemplated the purchase
of twenty acres CFI relies upon section 15 of the Purchase Contract to justify the recording of the
lis pendens CFI, however, ignores two essential facts First, the Purchase Contract terminated by
its own terms Second, Section 15 was superseded by Addendum No 1, whereby the parties agreed
to arbitrate any disagreement over the terms of the agreement without the threat of an action being •
filed or lis pendens being recorded If arbitration were unsuccessful, the parties agreed that the
Purchase Contract would be rendered null and void.

Now, eleven months has passed since the termination of the Purchase Contract, and PWA
has expended valuable time and resources working with other adjacent property owners to obtain
Summit County approval of the development of over 7,000 acres within The Canyons Specially
Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"). In short, the recording of the lis pendens was made not to
prevent conveyance of the property but rather to coerce PWA to settle regardless of the merits of
CFI's claims. Therefore, this Court should dismiss this action and order that the lis pendens be
released to allow the development of The Canyons SPA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code ofJudicial Administration, the following facts are
submitted in support of PWA's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title.
1.

PWA is the owner of an approximately seventy-five (75) acre parcel of real property

in Summit County near The Canyons Ski Resort, the legal description of which is contained in the
Notice of Lis Pendens recorded in this action. (A copy of the Notice of Lis Pendens is attached hereto as

Exhibit "A.") PWA recently completed final plans for the development of this property, which is
commonly referred to as the "Frostwood Development."
2.

Over a year and a half ago, on or about June 5, 1998, CFI, through its real estate

agent, Brent Ferrin, presented to PWA a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract"),
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference, whereby CFI
offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (the
"Property") for the purchase price of $ 15,000,000. {See Answer and Counterclaim of Park West Associates
and Beaver Creek Associates (the "Counterclaim"), dated December 7,1999, ^ 9; Affidavit of Richard E. Frost, dated
December 3, 1999 ("Frost Affidavit"), U 4; Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III, dated December 8, 1999 ("Plumb
Affidavit"), U 4.)

3.

Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI was to purchase the Property by making a

550,000 earnest money deposit, paying 52,950,000 cash at the time of closing, and financing the
balance of 512,500,000 over four (4) years. (Counterclaim,^ 9; Purchase Contract, *2.)
4.

Although the Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by members

of the Utah Association of Realtors, it was expressly "subject to" certain "Special Contingencies."
(Purchase Contract, 1 9.) The Purchase Contract stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of
12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to
Summit County Approval of density, zoning and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding
the dates set forth in this transaction." (Purchase Contract, «!*[ 9.8, 9.9, and 21.) In the event any one of
these special contingencies did not occur, the Purchase Contract would terminate automatically and
PWA would no longer be obligated to sell the Property to CFI. (Frost Affidavit, % 5; Plumb Affidavit, H 5.)
5.

On or about June 8, 1999, PWA made a counter-proposal to CFI through an

addendum to the Purchase Contract ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part
of Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. (Counterclaim, K 11.)
6.

Pursuant to Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract was amended to modify the

foregoing contingencies and to further refine the conditions precedent to closing. In particular, it
was agreed that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of obtaining
Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that "Buyer shall submit
Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related development
within the same area]. The Plan shall include architecture for a 400 unit timeshare project." (See
Addendum No. 1, K 6.) In other words, the Buyer accepted full responsibility for satisfying the
contingency of obtaining Summit County approval of its timeshare project. (Id.) CFI, however,

A

never submitted architectural drawings for its timeshare project to PWA or Summit County. (Frost
Affidavit,! 11.)

7.

In addition, PWA and CFI understood and agreed to the following additional terms

contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Addendum No. 1:
8.a)
Summit County has stated that its preferred development is timeshare,
interval ownership, or hotel/motel;
8.b) Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of whole ownership
including 63 residential lots, which shall remain such after Buyer's County approvals
are received;
8.c)
Summit County and The Canyons have indicated an overall square foot
parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet;
8 .d) It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver for the additional
square footage in the timeshare portion necessary for Buyers required units; and
8.e)
If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this contract may be
canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller.
9.
This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final approval by
County of Buyer's timeshare project or December 31,1998.
(Addendum No. l, «ffl 8 and 9 (emphasis added).) In summary, the Purchase Contract, as a condition to
closing, required final Summit County approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525 square
feet each or 610,000 total square feet, 257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury single
family homes with a contemplated average of 4,000 square feet and 195 multifamily units with an
average of 2000 square feet for a total of 638,000 square feet. (Id.)
8.

Addendum No. 1 further modified the Purchase Contract by providing that any

disagreement over its terms "shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. If
agreement cannot be reached within 60 daysfromthe beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall
receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void." (Id. n 12.) PWA expressly
demanded the inclusion of this provision for the purpose of avoiding any kind of litigation over the
terms of the Purchase Contract because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. (See Plumb

^

Affidavit <I 7; Frost Affidavit, ^ 7.)

9.

Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms of this

ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including all prior
addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control." (Addendum No. l, at 2.)
10.

On or about June 14, 1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract and

Addendum No. 1. (See Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1.)

11.

In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, on June

25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the Property:
a.

Surrounding Parcels/As Shown on Topo;

b.

Topo Survey;

c.

Documentation of Recent Impact Fees;

d.

Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and

e.

Owners Agreement.

CFI never responded to either PWA or the architects regarding PWA's designs. (See Frost Affidavit,
119.)
12.

By September 2, 1998, in addition to the items identified above, PWA had delivered

to CFI the Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's
Preliminary Title Report, and Seller's Property Disclosure. (Frost Affidavit^ 10; Plumb Affidavit, ^10.)
13.

In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for CFI's

twenty-acre proposed timeshare project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever
submitted to P W A . (Frost Affidavit, f 11; Plumb Affidavit, II11.)

14.

Because of CFPs failure to meet established deadlines, including its failure to submit

a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998,
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was
no longer valid. (Frost Affidavit,

15.

f

12, Plumb Affidavit,

c

12.)

In early December 1998, a meeting was held between CFI and PWA whereby it was

expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in the Purchase
Contract had not been met and could not be met by December 31, 1998 and that if CFI wanted to
avoid terminating the Purchase Contract, a new purchase contract and/or addendum would need to
be entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31,1998. (Frost Affidavit, «| 13, Plumb Affidavit,
113.)
16.

On December 17, 1998, Mark Waltrip, Director of Real Estate and Development at

CFI, wrote to Dick Frost, a general partner of PWA, explaining why he believed the Purchase
Contract remained in full force and effect. (Frost Affidavit, H 14.)
17.

Notwithstanding CFFs written assertions, PWA understood that the Purchase Contract

terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998, when the parties failed to close the sale, a fact
that Mr. Frost expressly stated to Mark Waltrip. {Id., U 15; see also Addendum No. 1, % 9 (purchase of the
Property was subject to the transaction closing on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or 15 days after final Summit

County approval).) Thus, when December 31,1998 came and went without Summit County's approval
of CFI's timeshare project, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated.
18.

In the early part of 1999, CFI repeatedly attempted to reinstate the Purchase Contract

by presenting several proposals to amend. At no time did PWA agree to reinstate the Purchase
Contract. {Id., H 16; Plumb Affidavit, \ 16.)
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19.

On or about April 30, 1999, counsel for CFI wrote a letter to PWA, wherein he

asserted that "the Purchase Contract is in full force and effect" and that his client "stands ready,
willing and able to perform subject to compliance by [PWA] with its obligations thereunder." As
part of the letter, counsel admitted that an amendment to the Purchase Contract "has not been
executed" extending its terms. (See Michael E. Marder's letter, dated April 30,1999, a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit "C") Significantly, the letter completely ignored and failed to address the special
contingencies that were material to the Purchase Contract closing. (Id.; see Purchase Contract, H 9 and
Addendum No. 1.)

20.

With the termination of the Purchase Contract, PWA moved forward with its efforts

to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development of 7,000 acres being planned
for the area surrounding The Canyons Ski Resort and amending The Canyons Specially Planned
Area Plan ("First SPA Plan").1
a.

In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property owners

about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of the First SPA Plan adopted by Summit County
on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a group of property owners: namely, American Skiing
Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah, Inc., Iron Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain
Resort, L.C., C&M Properties, and Groutage. (Frost Affidavit,«] 17; Plumb Affidavit, U 17.) Negotiations
over the amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the summer of
1999. (Frost Affidavit, 1| 17; Plumb Affidavit, U 17.)

The property owners participating in amending the First SPA Plan are identified on Exhibit "D" attached
hereto.

b.

After expressing an interest in participating, PWA executed a "Non-binding

Statement of Acknowledgment" whereby it committed to being included in a proposed amendment
to the First SPA Plan. (Frost Affidavit, «[ 17; Plumb Affidavit.

c.

c

17.)

On several occasions, PWA representatives spoke with representatives of CFI

and informed them of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA Plan. (Frost Affidavit,
«! 17; Plumb Affidavit, ^ 17.)

21.

Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing through November 1999, PWA

representatives, particularly Mr. Frost, participated extensively with the adjacent property owners
to secure approval from Summit County of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that
process, PWA representatives participated in numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss
the various proposals, including the County's demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within
the amended development plan. (Frost Affidavit, n 18; Plumb Affidavit, H 18.)
22.

It also became evident that Summit County's approval was still far from certain. It

was then decided that a committee would be formed from the thirty-one property owners involved
in securing an amendment to the First SPA Plan to work toward securing approval from Summit
County. Mr. Frost, of PWA, was asked to serve on this committee, along with Robert Sacks and
Joseph Tesch and representatives of ASC, Inc. (including Ed Grampp, John Vehenian and Greg
Speam). The committee was responsible for the development of the two major documents that were
ultimately to govern the entire development, along with a budget for the same. It was also charged
with the responsibility of preparing the Articles of Incorporation of The Canyons SPA Village
Management Agreement and The Canyons Restated and Amended Development Agreement. Along
with the foregoing work, the committee dealt with issues such as water, sewer, electricity and other
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infrastructure. Over the course of approximately ten months (early 1999 through November 15,
1999), Mr. Frost, on behalf of PWA, and the other participants expended approximately 300 hours
of time working with the committee and Summit County on matters relating to obtaining approval
for the amendment of the First SPA Plan. During this period of time, Mr. Frost participated in
numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's
demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became
apparent that this was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA
Plan. (Frost Affidavit, t 18.)

23.

Since January of this year alone, PWA has incurred expenses relating to obtaining

approval of the amendment to the First SPA Plan in excess of $100,000. (Frost Affidavit, ^19; Plumb
Affidavit H 19.)
24.

On November 15, 1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified and

approved the Amended and Restated Development Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned
Area ("The Canyons SPA"), which had been executed previously by PWA on November 8,1999,
and which contemplates the development of a master-planned resort community (the "Project") for
The Canyons on over 7,000 acres of land in Summit County. (Frost Affidavit, H 20; Plumb Affidavit, 1(20.)
The Canyons SPA allocated to the Frostwood Project and PWA 857,000 square feet, including
approximately 40,000 square feet of commercial space. (Due to the size and length of The Canyons
SPA, PWA will make a copy of it available to the Court at the hearing or upon its request.) PWA
was also obligated to deed 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres to Summit County,
further reducing the development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. (Frost Affidavit,^;
Plumb Affidavit, f 20.)
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25.

The approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood Property is located within the Project

and, in particular, "The Canyons Resort Center." The Frostwood Property's periphery7 is to be used
primarily for open space, including the development of a portion of an eighteen-hole golf course.
In fact, the Frostwood Property encompasses the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf
course. (Frost Affidavit. T 21; Plumb Affidavit, 1i 21.)

26.

Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject to

strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development
of the project. (See Frost Affidavit,«! 22; Plumb Affidavit,«I 22; Affidavit of Joe Tesch, % 7-9; Affidavit of Ray Klein
in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, 1) 7-9; Affidavit of Ron Ferrin in Support of Motion to Dismiss and
to Quiet Title, f 7-9; Affidavit of Robert Fogg in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. *f 7-9; Affidavit of
Everett N. Goodwin in Support of Motion of Dismiss and to Quiet Title, ^ 7-8; Affidavit of Annette Baker in Support
of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, 1J 7-9; Affidavit of John B. Hewlett in support of Motion to Dismiss and to
Quiet Title, f7-9 (PWA shall refer to the foregoing affidavits collectively as the "Participant Affidavits").)

27.

Under the terms of The Canyons SPA, the Project is to be phased in by expansion

outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood Property. For this reason,
construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in developing the Resort Core
and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property. (See Participant Affidavits.)
28.

Anticipating Summit County's ratification of The Canyons SPA, CFI commenced this

action and recorded a lis pendens against all seventy-five acres in the Frostwood Property. (See
Complaint, 1)4.)

29.

CFI's filing of this action and recording of lis pendens were made knowingly or

having reason to know that the claims were groundless, since its filing of the complaint and
recording of the lis pendens are not authorized by the Purchase Contract, which terminated by its
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own terms on December 31,1998, and the lis pendens covers far more property than that which was
subject to the Purchase Contract. In fact, the filing of this action and the recording of lis pendens
are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1.
30.

On November 12,1999, counsel for PWA gave written notice reiterating to CFI that

the Purchase Contract terminated on December 31, 1998. (See Letter from Mark R. Gaylord, dated
November 12. 1999, attached hereto as Exhibit "E.") PWA's counsel went on to explain that:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the
termination provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives
you written notice that the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance
with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C, D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum
1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood Project would require a base density of
959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square footage necessary for CFFs
timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that approximately 1.2 million
square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to achieve a 400
unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet
each (248,000 total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately
2,000 square feet each (390,000 total square feet).
As of November 8,1999, thefinalSpa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the
property deeded to Summit County described below), of which approximately 40,000
is commercial. An additional 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres
must be deeded by PWA to Summit County, further reducing the development
entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the 957,000 square feet
required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional square
footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's
additional 257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots.
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of all rights under the Purchase
Contract, including the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the
Purchase Contract in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit
County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project the minimum square footage
established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract.
(See Exhibit "E," at pp. 1-2.) Finally, counsel went on to demand that CFI dismiss the complaint and
release the lis pendens.
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31.

As of today's date, CFI has failed to comply with the Purchase Contract by dismissing

the complaint or releasing the lis pendens.
32.

More importantly, CFI's action is seriously threatening the successful completion of

The Canyons SPA development, including the golf course, which will cause irreparable harm to the
other participants in The Canyons SPA development plan. (See Participant Affidavits.)
33.

In particular, The Canyons SPA grants the participants certain development

entitlements to which properties within the Project are currently entitled. Any delay in the timely
development and completion of, among other things, the golf course or the Project may cause the
participants to lose the development entitlements, thereby causing irreparable damage because of
the reduced economic and development potential of the entire Project. (See Participant Affidavits.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS ACTION AGAINST PWA BECAUSE THE
PURCHASE CONTRACT AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED, ACCORDING TO
ITS TERMS, ON DECEMBER 31,1998.
According to the express terms of the Purchase Contract, the transaction at issue in this case

was required to close no later than December 31,1998. The Purchase Contract further provided that
M

[t]ime is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction." (See Purchase Contract, U 21.)

Because, as a matter of law, the Purchase Contract that CFI seeks to enforce automatically expired,
according to its terms, on December 31,1998, this action is without merit and should be dismissed.2
A motion to dismiss is appropriate "where it clearly appears that the plaintiffs would not be
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their

In addition, this lawsuit is prohibited by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1, which requires that all
disagreements be submitted to arbitration and that if arbitration is unsuccessful, the Purchase Agreement is
null and void.
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claim." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Because the contents of the
Purchase Contract are alleged in the complaint and the authenticity of the Purchase Contract is
undisputed, this Court may properly consider the contents of the Purchase Contract on a motion to
dismiss. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.l (9th Cir. 1994). Because PWA is
submitting extrinsic materials in support of this Motion, however, to the extent this Court deems it
necessary to rely on such materials, it may also properly treat this Motion as one for summary
judgment. Certified Surety Group, Ltd. v. UTInc., 960 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1998).
A review of the Purchase Contract leads to the inevitable conclusion that the contract expired
on December 31, 1998, when the transaction failed to close. Where a contract makes time of the
essence and sets a firm closing date, the contract terminates, according to its terms, when the
transaction fails to close on the closing date. See Century 21 All Western Real Estate and
Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 n.l (Utah 1982); Mid-Town Limited Partnership v.
Preston, 848 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).3 In Preston, an action seeking specific
performance of a real estate purchase contract, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the complaint because the contract had expired by its
terms when the parties failed to close by the closing date. Id. at 1272-73. (A true and correct copy of
the Preston opinion is attached as Exhibit "F.") The court emphasized that "[t]ime was of the essence of the
sale agreement," and that, upon the passing of the closing date, the "expiration [of the contract] was
automatic." Id. at 1272.

Alternatively, because Addendum No. 1 provides that its terms govern over any inconsistent terms
contained in the Purchase Contract, the provisions in Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration are controlling.
As a result in the event this Court denies PWA's Motion to Dismiss, at the very least, the Court should
enter an order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
Purchase Contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4.
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As set forth above, the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1 provide that "[tjhis
transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final approval by County of Buyer's timeshare
project or December 31,1998." It is undisputed that the transaction did not close by December 31,
1998. It is also undisputed that Summit County never approved CFI's timeshare project. It also
cannot be disputed that time was of the essence regarding the dates in the transaction. Accordingly,
under the terms of Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract automatically
terminated as of December 31, 1998. Therefore, as a matter of law, CFFs claims are barred by the
express language of the Purchase Contract, and'this Court should dismiss the case with prejudice.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE LIS PENDENS
RECORDED AGAINST THE FROSTWOOD PROPERTY BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES A WRONGFUL LIEN.
Even if the Court declines to dismiss the case, it should immediately order that the lis

pendens recorded against the entire 75-acre Frostwood Property be released. As early as November
1998, CFI knew or had reason to know that the Purchase Contract would terminate on December
31,1998, unless the transaction closed or it secured either a new contract or an amendment thereto.
When the December 31, 1998 closing deadline passed, CFI knew or should have known that the
Purchase Contract had expired automatically. Because the Purchase Contract terminated, any rights
CFI had in the Property terminated, and the lis pendens, therefore, constitutes a wrongful lien under
Utah law. Because CFI knew or had reason to know that the lis pendens was either a wrongful lien
or "groundless," this Court should declare the lis pendens void ab initio, release the lis pendens, and
award PWA damages and reasonable attorney's fees under the Wrongful Lien Act.
Pursuant to section 38-9-1(6) of the Utah Code, a "wrongful lien" is any document "that
purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
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it is recorded or filed is not, among other things, "expressly authorized by this chapter or another
state or federal statute" or "signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of
the real property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a), (c). The lis pendens recorded by CFI was not
"expressly authorized" by the wrongful lien statute or another state or federal statute or by any
document signed by the owner of the Property.4
A person who records a "wrongful lien" is liable to the property owner for any "actual
damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien." Id. § 38-9-4(1). The recorder of the wrongful
lien is farther liable in the amount of SI,000 or treble actual damages, whichever is greater, in the
event the recorder fails to release the wrongful lien within twenty days from the date of a written
request, by the property owner, to release the wrongful lien. Id. § 38-9-4(2). When the person who
recorded the wrongful lien did so "knowing or having reason to know that the document" is a
"wrongful lien" or "groundless," the person is liable in the amount of $3,000 or treble actual
damages, whichever is greater. Id. § 38-9-4(3)(a), (b).
The only reasonable conclusion in this case is that CFI filed this action and recorded the
accompanying lis pendens fully realizing that the Purchase Contract had terminated and that the lis
pendens was not authorized to be recorded against the twenty-acre Property subject to the Purchase
Contract, let alone the entire seventy-five acre Frostwood Property, which now forms an integral part

In recording the lis pendens, CFI undoubtedly relies on the "DISPUTE RESOLUTION" section of the
Purchase Contract, which provides that "[n]othing in this - shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific
performance by the Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided
that the Buyer permits the seller to refrain from serving the complaint pending mediation." This provision,
however, was superseded by Addendum No. 1, which requires all disagreements to be submitted to
arbitration and does not expressly permit the recording of a lis pendens "with regard to" arbitration.
Accordingly, this action and the accompanying lis pendens are not even authorized by Addendum No. 1.
Because the lis pendens is not authorized, it is a "wrongful lien" under Utah law, and section 38-9-2(2) of
the Utah Code does not affect this action. This Court, therefore, should immediately release the lien and
award PWA appropriate damages.
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of The Canyons SPA As a result, because CFI knew, at the time the lis pendens was recorded, that
it was not authorized, CFI knew it was a wrongful hen Utah Code Ann § 38-9-l(6)(a), (c) CFI
further knew that the lis pendens was "groundless" because it had "no arguable basis or is not
supported by any credible evidence " CommercialInv Corp \ Siggard, 936 P 2d 1105,1111 (Utah
Ct App), cert denied, 945 P 2d 1118 (Utah 1997)' Indeed, because the Purchase Contract
automatically expired according to its terms on December 31, 1998, this Court may conclude, as a
matter of law, that CFI should have known its recording of a lis pendens was "groundless " See
Winters v Schulman, 977 P 2d 1218, 1223-24 (Utah Ct App ) (concluding that, as a matter of law,
lis pendens was "groundless" when filed because a review of Utah law would have revealed that lis
pendens is not entitled to be recorded unless action is pending), cert denied, - P 2d - (Utah 1999)
Because CFI knew, or should have known, that the lis pendens was a wrongful hen, or that it was
"groundless," PWA respectfully requests that this Court award it damages, including reasonable
attorney's fees, pursuant to section 38-9-4
III.

AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, THIS COURT SHOULD CANCEL THE LIS
PENDENS RECORDED AGAINST THE FROSTWOOD PROPERTY.
A.

CFI Knowingly Allowed The Purchase Contract To Terminate By Its Own
Terms More Than Eleven Months Ago And Has No Vested Rights in the
Property.

CFI's Complaint, although simplistic in its content, was filed just four (4) short days before
Summit County approved The Canyons SPA (See Complaint.) What is interesting is that CFI
conveniently fails to attach the agreement that forms the basis of its allegations

Rather, it

gratuitously and inaccurately alleges the terms and conditions of the Purchase Contract in hopes of

Significantly, in Siggard, the court upheld a jury verdict against buyers of real property who recorded a
notice of interest against an entire thirty-eight acre parcel, although the buyers were entitled to purchase
only sixteen acres of the parcel
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stalling the development of The Canyons SPA and, by such action, extorting a favorable settlement
out of PWA. Although CFI contends it performed all conditions precedent, one fact remains
undisputed -- on December 31, 1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by its own
terms. Based upon this termination, this Court, as a matter of law, must conclude that CFI has no
vested rights in the Property.
B.

Laches Precludes CFI From Asserting that the Purchase Contract Did Not
Terminate By Its Own Terms.

CFI's main assertion in claiming an interest in the Property rests upon its claim that it is
entitled to specific performance under the Purchase Contract. (See Complaint, «[«; 2-12.) Putting aside
the fact that CFI was privy to virtually every decision relating to the development of the Property,
CFI's argument is irrelevant because of its own inability to comply with the express terms of the
Purchase Contract and to provide PWA with the necessary architectural drawings to move the
timeshare development forward.
More importantly, by the middle of November 1998 (and no later than December 4, 1998),
CFI knew the deal would not close by December 31, 1998 and that the Purchase Contract would
expire by its own terms. Yet, it failed to secure either a new agreement or an addendum extending
the automatic termination date. Once the Purchase Contract terminated, CFI sat back and let PWA
expend valuable time and resources negotiating with the other participants in putting together The
Canyons SPA. Then, just four (4) days before The Canyons SPA was approved, CFI suddenly cried
foul and filed a complaint seeking specific performance. By lying in wait, CFI is barred by the
doctrine of laches from asserting its claims.
To establish laches, two elements must be met: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of
plaintiff and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Bros. Enters.

v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256,1260 (Utah 1975). Laches will not apply
simply from the standpoint of delay, but rather from delay that works a disadvantage to another. Id.
In the present case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that CFI delayed in a manner that
worked a disadvantage to PWA. By December 4, 1998, CFI knew that if it did not act. the Purchase
Contract would terminate as of December 31, 1998. CFI did nothing, however, to ensure it had
complied with all of the requirements necessary to fulfill the terms of the Purchase Contract. Nor
did it do anything to have the Purchase Contract reinstated or have a new contract formed.
Likewise, and equally important, CFI knew that PWA was actively participating in having
the First SPA Plan amended to include the entire Frostwood Property and that the golf course
Summit County demanded as part of the approval would require PWA to leave portions of the
property as open space. CFI knew that PWA was expending considerable time and resources in
securing approval of The Canyons SPA. Despite this knowledge, CFI provided no support for or
assistance to this effort. It did nothing to stop the approval of The Canyons SPA. Instead, it sat back
and, just days before Summit County approval was granted, filed this lawsuit and recorded a lis
pendens not only against the twenty acres it had hoped to purchase but the entire Frostwood
Property.
If CFI truly believed that the Purchase Agreement had not terminated as of December 31,
1998, it would have been actively involved with PWA in securing approval of The Canyons SPA
with its proposed development. CFI was not actively involved and, in fact, was virtually
non-existent. Accordingly, this Court must conclude, as a matter of law, that CFI rested on its rights
and that its claims are barred by doctrine of laches.
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C.

As A Matter Of Equity, The Court Should Cancel The Lis Pendens Recorded
By CFI.

Although a lis pendens is a creature of statute, it has its roots in common-law and equity
jurisprudence. Kelly v. Perry\ 531 P.2d 139, 140-141 (Ariz. 1975). At common law, the mere
pendency of a lawsuit purporting to affect title to real property constituted constructive notice to all
the world. Id:, Dice v. Bender, 117 A.2d 725, 727 (Pa. 1955); McCahill v. Roberts, 219 A.2d 306,
308 (Pa. 1966). Lis pendens statutes are designed to provide a better form of notice to those who
may become interested in the real property involved in the litigation. White v. Wensauer, 702 P.2d
15, 18(Okla. 1985).
Such statutes, however, do not confer any additional substantive rights than those existing
at common law. Kelly, 531 P.2d at 140. In fact, these statutes actually limit the scope of a lis
pendens by making the notice effective only when the action is filed in accordance with the
statutorily prescribed provisions and the procedural requirements for the lis pendens have been met.
Wensauer, 702 P.2d at 18. A lis pendens merely operates to bind third parties with notice that any
interest they may acquire in the property pending litigation will be subject to the outcome of the
lawsuit. McCahill, 219 A.2d at 309; Dice 117 A.2d at 727.
Utah has a lis pendens statute. Contained in a chapter of the Utah Code devoted to quiet title
actions, this statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the objection of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice of
record, only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be
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deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against parties designated by their real names.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. The statute makes no provision for anyone other than the party claiming
an interest in the property to file the lis pendens.
Because the doctrine of lis pendens is derived from notions of common-law and equity
jurisprudence, it is subject to equitable principles. Wensauer, 702 P.2d at 18. For example, if the
operation of a lis pendens would prove harsh or arbitrary, a court should use its equity powers to
refuse to give it effect. Id. Under its broad equity powers, therefore, a court can cancel, release, or
discharge a notice of lis pendens that might otherwise be burdensome. Id. In Altman v. City of
Lansing, 321 N.W.2d 707 (Mich. 1981), for example, the trial court quashed a notice of lis pendens,
and that decision was affirmed on appeal:
We hold that the lower court did not err in canceling plaintiffs' notice of lis
pendens. The benefit that plaintiffs would receive under the notice of lis
pendens is too minimal in comparison to the harm that defendants will
suffer. In Silberstein v. Silberstein, 252 Mich. 192, 194, 233 N.W. 222
(1930), the Supreme Court held that a technically proper notice of'lispendens
which meets all of the statutory requirements could be canceled on equitable
principles if in the discretion of a trial judge the benefits of the notice are far
outweighed by the damage it causes.
If the notice of lis pendens were revived in this case, progress on the Capitol
Commons Project likely would come to a halt. Thus, defendants stand to be
greatly harmed by the filing of a notice of lis pendens. On the other hand, it
is extremely unlikely that plaintiffs will ever succeed in this action. The
equities then lie entirely on the side of the defendants. Therefore, wefindthat
the lower court did not err in canceling the notice of lis pendens.
Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
Like the plaintiff in Altman, CFI is not entitled to the benefits of a lis pendens when the harm
it faces is minimal in comparison to the harm imposed upon the entire Canyons SPA development.
This is a situation in which the benefits to CFI are far outweighed by the damage its lis pendens will

UT DOCS A 1030464 v 1

21

cause to PWA and the other SPA participants.

(See Participant Affidavits.)

Under these

circumstances, the Court should extinguish the lis pendens recorded against the Property.
As set forth in the Participant Affidavits, the lis pendens recorded in this action against a
seventy-acre portion of the Project threatens to undermine the progress of the entire Project, which
consists of over 7,000 acres. The lis pendens threatens the development of the golf course, which
is of the utmost priority to Summit County, because the Frostwood Property encompasses four of
the eighteen holes constituting the golf course. Owners of nearby properties are unable to proceed
with development of their portions of the Project because of the detrimental effect of the lis pendens.
As in Altman, the effect of this lis pendens is to likely grind to "a halt" the progress of the entire
Project. Altman, 321 N.W.2d at 713. PWA and numerous nearby property owners who are part of
The Canyons SPA "stand to be greatly harmed by the filing of'CFI's lis pendens in this matter." Id.
In contrast, as in Altman^ii is extremely unlikely that [CFI] will ever succeed in this action."
Id.6 As set forth above, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated, as a matter of law, on
December 31, 1998, when the transaction failed to close. Because the benefits, if any, of the lis
pendens to CFI are far outweighed by the irreparable harm being inflicted on PWA and nearby
property owners, the equities in this case "lie entirely" on the side of PWA and the other property
owners. Id.\ see also Perry, 531 P.2d at 141 (refusing to prohibit order canceling lis pendens
because it had potential to impair development of project on seventy-acre parcel, the court stated that

Indeed, this action by CFI appears to have been brought for the purpose of tying up the Frostwood Property
to impede progress on the Project. In that respect, CFFs actions are similar to those of the plaintiff in
Hillberg, v. Superior Court, 263 Cal. Rptr. 675, 677-78 (Ct. App. 1989). In that case, the court determined
that the trial court should have considered whether the action had not been commenced in good faith, given
that the plaintiff property buyer had failed to comply with conditions precedent to the purchase of the
property. Id. The court specifically noted that "[w]e cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyersthat the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyance of the property that is the
subject of the lawsuit, but to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits." Id. at 677.
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"[t]he potential future loss to respondents while the case is slowly wending its way through the court
system is disproportionately high when compared to the petitioner's claimed rights"). Accordingly,
this Court should use its equitable powers to immediately release the lis pendens.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, PWA respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion
and enter an order dismissing the action, releasing the lis pendens, and awarding PWA appropriate
damages, including its attorney's fees, in pursuing the foregoing relief.
DATED this 8th day of December, 1999.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates
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Mark R. Gaylord (#5073)
Craig H. Howe (#7552)

By

TWW District Court
"^•Puty Clerk, sum'mtl

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 1200
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2215
Telephone: (801) 531-3000
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC. a
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
OF PARKWEST ASSOCIATES AND
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES

vs.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES, AND
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Civil No. 990600361CR
Defendants.
Judge Pat Brian

Defendants, Park West Associates ("Parkwest") and Beaver Creek Associates
("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA"), by and through their counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews &
Ingersoll, LLP, hereby admit, deny and answer Central Florida Investment, Inc.'s ("CFI")
Complaint. PWA will respond, paragraph by paragraph, to the allegations in CFI's Complaint.
Unless hereinafter specifically admitted, however, each and every allegation of the Complaint is
denied.
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First Cause of Action
1.

PWA admits that on or about June 14, 1998, CFI and PWA entered into that

certain Real Estate Purchase Contract, including Addendum No. 1 (the "Purchase Contract"), a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. PWA affirmatively asserts that the Purchase Contract
speaks for itself and contains all of the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties.
Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 1 of the
Complaint.
2.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the

Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining
allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint.
3.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the

Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining
allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint.
4.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the

Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining
allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
5.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the

Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,

-2-

which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
6.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the

Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Complaint.
7.

PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Complaint.

8.

PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. PWA

affirmatively asserts that CFI is not and never has been ready, willing and able to purchase the
property consistent with the terms of the Purchase Contract.
9.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the

Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint.
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10

PWA admits that CFI has elected to sue for "specific performance and/or

damages" PWA denies any and all remaining allegations contained m paragraph 10 of the
Complaint
11

PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint

12

PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint
Second Cause of Action

13

PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1-12 of the Complaint
14

PWA admits the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint as

it relates to the Purchase Contract
15

PWA lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth

or veracity of the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and, therefore, denies the
same
16

PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the Complaint
Third Cause of Action

17

PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1-16 of the Complaint
18

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of

the Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself

PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
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required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint.
19.

PWA admits that CFI is seeking attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing

party. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the
Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response is required.
Fourth Cause of Action
20.

PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1-19 of the Complaint.
21.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of

the Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
required, and, therefore, denies the same.
22.

PWA lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth and veracity

of the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the Complaint and therefore denies the same.
23.

PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of

the Complaint reflect CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto,
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 23 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is
required, and, therefore, denies the same.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
First Affirmative Defense
CFFs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Second Affirmative Defense
CFI's claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.
Third Affirmative Defense
CFI is estopped by its own conduct or the conduct of its agents from maintaining any
cause of action against PWA.
Fourth Affirmative Defense
CFFs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and/or laches.
Fifth Affirmative Defense
CFFs claims are barred by its breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
Sixth Affirmative Defense
To the extent CFI has any claim for damages, which claim is expressly denied, PWA
is entitled to an offset against CFI in the amount of the damages incurred by PWA as a result of
CFFs breaches of duty and other wrongful acts.
Seventh Affirmative Defense
PWA has been required to obtain counsel to represent it against the claims alleged
by CFI in this Complaint. PWA is, therefore, entitled to its reasonable attorneys fees and costs
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incurred herein because CFI's claims are filed in bad faith, are without merit or are otherwise in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Eighth Affirmative Defense
PWA has made improvements to the Property at issue and to the extent CFI has any
claims for damages related to that Property, which claims are expressly denied, PWA is entitled
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-5 to an offset for the value of those improvements.
Ninth Affirmative Defense
CFI has failed to mitigate its damages.
Tenth Affirmative Defense
CFI's lis pendens was not filed in accordance with applicable law and CFI also lacks
standing and has no interest in the Property to justify the filing of a lis pendens.
Eleventh Affirmative Defense
CFI's damages, if any, were proximately caused by third parties over whom PWA
had no control.
Twelfth Affirmative Defense
CFI's Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the bad faith conduct of CFI and/or
its agents.
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Thirteenth Affirmative Defense
CFFs claims are barred in whole or in part by the provisions of the Utah Recording
Act.
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense
CFFs claims are barred by principles of equitable and promissory estoppel and, as
a result, CFI may not seek or claim any interest in the real property that is the subject of this action.
WHEREFORE, PWA prays for judgment against CFI as follows: That the Complaint
be dismissed with prejudice and that CFI take nothing thereby; that PWA be awarded its costs of
suit, including reasonable attorneys fees; and that PWA have such other and further relief as to the
Court deems just and merited.
COUNTERCLAIM
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates
(collectively "PWA"), complain and allege against counterclaim-defendant, Central Florida
Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Park West Associates is a Utah general partnership, with its principal place

of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Beaver Creek Associates is a Utah limited partnership, with its principal place

of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Counterclaim arises out of the same transactions, occurrences and

dealings that are the subject matter of CFFs Complaint.
5.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Rules 13 and 14 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-13-1 and 78-

7.

The declaratory relief requested herein is authorized under Utah Code Ann.

13-4.

§ 78-33-1 et. seq.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
8.

In the Spring of 1998, CFI, by and through its real estate agent, Brent Ferrin,

and PWA engaged in negotiations for the purchase and sale of a twenty-acre parcel located in
Summit County near The Canyons Ski Resort. In April of 1998, Mr. Ferrin, on behalf of CFI,
presented a proposed real estate purchase contract to PWA, which proposal went through a number
of reiterations and addendums.
9.

On or about June 5, 1998, CFI, by and through its agent Brent Ferrin,

presented to PWA a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract"), a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference, whereby CFI offered to
purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (hereinafter
"Property") for the purchase price of $15,000,000. Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI was to
purchase the Property by making a $50,000 earnest money deposit, paying $2,950,000 cash at the

UT_DOCS_A 1030375 v 1

-9-

time of closing and financing the balance of $12,500.000 over four (4) years. The Purchase Contract
stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan
approval."
10.

Although the Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by

members of the Utah Association of Realtors, it was expressly "subject to" certain "Special
Contingencies." The Purchase Contract stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98
or 15 days after Final Master Plan approval," that the "[e]ntire agreement [was] subject to Summit
County approval of density, zoning and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding the dates
set forth in this transaction." In the event any one of these special contingencies did not occur, the
Purchase Contract would be rendered null and void and PWA would not be obligated to sell the
Property to CFI.
11.

On or about June 8, 1998, PWA made a counter-proposal to CFI through an

addendum to the Purchase Contract ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part
of Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.
12.

Pursuant to Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract was amended to modify

the foregoing contingencies and to further refine the conditions precedent to closing. In particular,
it was agreed that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of
obtaining Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that "Buyer shall
submit Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related
development within the same area]. The Plan shall include architecture for a 400 unit timeshare
project." In other words, the Buyer accepted full responsibility for satisfying the contingency of
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obtaining Summit County approval of its timeshare project. CFI never submitted architectural
drawings for its timeshare project to PWA or Summit County
13.

In addition, PWA and CFI understood and agreed to the following additional

terms contained in Sections 8 and 9 of Addendum No.l:
8. a) Summit County has stated that its preferred development is
timeshare, interval ownership, or hotel/motel;
8. b) Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of
whole ownership including 63 residential lots, which shall remain
such after Buyer's County approvals are received;
8. c) Summit County and the Canyons have indicated an overall
square foot parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet;
8. d) It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver
for the additional square footage in the timeshare portion necessary
for Buyers required units; and
8. e) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this
contract may be canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller.
9.
This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final
approval by County of Buyer's timeshare project or December 31,
1998.
In summary, the Purchase Contract, as a condition to closing, required final Summit County
approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525 square feet each or 610,000 total square feet,
257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury single family homes with a contemplated average
of 4,000 square feet and 195 multi-family units with an average of 2000 square feet for a total of
638,000 square feet.
14.

Addendum No. 1 further modified the Purchase Contract by providing that

any disagreement over its terms "shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller.
If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer
shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void." PWA expressly demanded
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the inclusion of this provision for the purpose of avoiding any kind of litigation over the terms of
the Purchase Contract because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics.
15.

Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms

of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including
all prior addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control."
16.

On or about June 14,1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract and

Addendum No. 1.
17.

In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1,

on June 25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the
Property:
a.

Surrounding Parcels/As Shown on Topo;

b.

Topo Survey;

c.

Documentation of Recent Impact Fees;

d.

Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and

e.

Owners Agreement.

CFI never responded to either PWA or the architects regarding PWA's designs.
18.

By September 2, 1998, in addition to the items identified in paragraph 17

above, PWA had delivered to CFI the Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and
Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's Preliminary Title Report, and Seller's Property Disclosure.
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19.

In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for

CFI's twenty-acre proposed timeshare project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever
submitted to PWA.
20.

Because of CFFs failure to meet established deadlines, including submission

of a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998,
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was
no longer valid.
21.

On December 4, 1998, a meeting was held between CFI and PWA, whereby

it was expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in the Purchase
Contract had not been and could not be met by December 31, 1998 and that if CFI wanted to avoid
terminating the Purchase Contract, a new purchase contract and/or addendum would need to be
entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31, 1998 to avoid termination.
22.

On December 17, 1998, Mark Waltrip, director of Real Estate and

Development at CFI, wrote a letter to Dick Frost, a general partner of PWA, to explain why he
believed the Purchase Contract remained in full force and effect.
23.

Notwithstanding CFI's written assertions, PWA notified representatives of

CFI that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms on December 31,1998 when the parties
failed to close the sale. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Addendum No. 1 to the Purchase Contract, the
purchase of the Property was "subject to" this transaction closing "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15
days after" final County approval. Thus, when December 31,1998 came and went without Summit
County's providing approval of CFI's timeshare project, the Purchase Contract terminated.
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24.

In the early part of 1999. CFI repeatedly made attempts to reinstate the

Purchase Contract by presenting sev eral proposals to amend. At no time did PWA agree to reinstate
the Purchase Contract.
25.

With the termination of the Purchase Contract, PWA moved forward with its

efforts to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development being planned for the
surrounding area of The Canyons Ski Resort.
a.

In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property

owners about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of The Canyons Specially Planned Area
Plan (the "First SPA Plan") adopted by Summit County on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a
group of property owners: namely, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah,
Inc., Iron Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain Resort, L.C., C&M Properties, and Groutage.
Negotiations over the amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the
summer of 1999.
b.

After expressing an interest, PWA executed a "Non-binding Statement

of Acknowledgment" on behalf of PWA whereby it committed to being included in a proposed
amendment to the First SPA Plan.
c.

On several occasions, PWA representatives spoke with CFI

representatives and informed them of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA
Plan.
26.

Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing throughout November,

PWA representatives participated extensively with the adjacent property owners to secure approval
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from Summit County of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that process, they attended
numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's
demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became
apparent that this was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA
Plan. The property owners participating in the First SPA Amendment are identified on Exhibit 2
attached hereto.
27.

On November 15,1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified

and approved the amendment to the First SPA Plan (hereinafter "The Canyons SPA"), which had
been executed previously by PWA on November 8, 1999, and which allocated to the Frostwood
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents, including approximately 40,000
square feet of commercial space. PWA was also obligated to deed 40,000 square feet of approved
density on four acres to Summit County, further reducing the development entitlements granted to
the Project and PWA.
28.

Under The Canyons SPA, the approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood

Property is located within the Project and, in particular, 'The Canyons Resort Center." The Project
is to be phased in by expansion outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood
Property. For this reason, construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in
developing the Resort Core and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property.
29.

Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject

to strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development
of the Project. The Frostwood Property's periphery is to be used primarily for open space, including
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the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf course. Indeed, section 3.2.6 of The Canyons
SPA requires, in part, that the parties "ensure that the course is completed within 36 months" of
November 15, 1999. Failure to meet this deadline could cause a revocation of all development
entitlements of all participants of The Canyons SPA, including PWA.
30.

Anticipating Summit County's ratification of The Canyons SPA, CFI

commenced this action and recorded a lis pendens on PWA's entire seventy-five-acre tract with the
Summit County Recorder's office.
31.

On information and belief, CFI's filing of this action and recording of to

pendens was made knowing or having reason to know that the claims were groundless since its filing
of the complaint and recording of the lis pendens are not authorized by the Purchase Contract and
cover far more property than that which was subject to the Purchase Contract. In fact, CFI's actions
are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1.
32.

On November 12, 1999, counsel for PWA gave written notice reiterating to

CFI that the Purchase Contract terminated on December 31,1999. A copy of the Letter from Mark
R. Gaylord, dated November 12, 1999, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. PWA's counsel went on to
explain that:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the
termination provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives
you written notice that the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance
with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C, D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum
1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood Project would require a base density of
959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square footage necessary for CFI's
timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that approximately 1.2 million
square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to achieve a 400
unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet
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each (248,000 total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately
2,000 square feet each (390,000 total square feet).
As of November 8,1999, the final Spa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the
property deeded to Summit County described below), of which approximately 40,000
is commercial. An additional 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres
must be deeded by PWA to Summit County, further reducing the development
entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the 957,000 square feet
required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional square
footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's
additional 257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots.
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of all rights under the Purchase
Contract, including the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the
Purchase Contract in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit
County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project the minimum square footage
established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract.
(See Exhibit 3 at pp. 1-2.) Finally, counsel went on to demand that CFI dismiss the complaint and
release the lis pendens.
33.

As of today's date, CFI has failed to comply with the Purchase Contract by

dismissing the complaint or releasing the lis pendens.
34.

Because of the lis pendens recorded against the Frostwood property, the

timely development and completion of the entire golf course has been jeopardized.
35.

CFI's action is threatening the successful completion of The Canyons SPA

development entirely, including the golf course, and the lis pendens will cause irreparable harm to
both PWA, as an owner of property subject to The Canyons SPA, and The Canyons SPA
development itself if not released immediately. This is particularly so, considering the 2002
Olympics are coming, and, therefore, time is of the essence.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment — Termination of Contract/Quiet Title)
36.

PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 35 of

the Counterclaim.
37.

A disagreement over the terms of the Purchase Contract has arisen.

38.

On November 9, 1999, CFI commenced this action and filed a lis pendens

against the Property.
39.

Pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Purchase Contract, CFI alleges that PWA is

in default and that it is entitled to elect "specific performance and/or damages."
40.

Concurrently, CFI has notified PWA of its intention to mediate in accordance

with section 15 of the Purchase Contract, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to
this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest Money
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of
the American Arbitration Association.... Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the
Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a complaint with the
court, serving it on the seller by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law,
and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that the Buyer permit
the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending arbitration. Also the
parties may agree in writing to waive mediation.
41.

On November 12, 1999, PWA notified CFI that its complaint was not

authorized in that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998. (See
Exhibit 3.) PWA further notified CFI that the filing of the Complaint was not permitted by the
Purchase Contract in that section 15 was superseded by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1, which
provides that "any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed
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upon by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning
of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and
void."
42.

PWA notified CFI that the filing of the Complaint was not permitted under

the terms and conditions of the Purchase Contract or Addendum No. 1.
43.

PWA further notified that the recording of the lis pendens was wrongful and

PWA demanded that it be released immediately. CFI's bad faith is evidenced by the fact that it filed
the lis pendens on seventy-five acres, when the Purchase Contract covered only twenty acres.
44.

Nevertheless, CFI has failed, refused and neglected to dismiss this case and/or

release the lis pendens.
45.

By virtue of its prior conduct, the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1,

and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, CFI has waived any and all interest or claim in and/or
to the Property.
46.
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PWA is entitled to a declaratory judgment of this Court as follows:
(1)

Determining that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms
on December 31, 1998;

(2)

Determining and declaring that the lis pendens is void and of no
effect;

(3)

Quieting title to the Property referenced herein in favor of PWA; and

(4)

Determining and declaring that CFI has no right, title or interest in
and to the Property.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Filing of Wrongful Lien)
47.

PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 46 of

the Counterclaim.
48.

The lis pendens purports to create a lien or encumbrance on PWA's interest

in the Property.
49.

At the time the lis pendens was recorded, it was not expressly authorized by

Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, et seq., or another state or federal statute and was, in fact, prohibited by
the Purchase Contract.
50.

As a result, the lien is a "wrongful lien" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1.

51.

On November 12, 1999, PWA gave written notice and a request to CFI to

dismiss the action and immediately release the lis pendens complained of herein.
52.

Upon information and belief, at the time the lis pendens was recorded, CFI

knew or had reason to know that the lien was "wrongful" or "groundless," under Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-9-4(3).
53.

There is no statutory or other specific or legal authority for the lis pendens

recorded by CFI. PWA has complied with all of the conditions precedent necessary to the bringing
of an action for damages under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq.
54.

As a direct, natural and proximate result of CFI's filing of the lis pendens, CFI

has seriously delayed and inhibited the development of the Property, The Canyons SPA ,and the golf
course; and PWA has incurred damages thereby in amounts to be proven at trial.
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55.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 and -3, PWA is entitled to an order

adjudging the lien to be wrongful, declaring the lis pendens void ab initio, and releasing the lis
pendens from the Property. PWA is also entitled to recover from CFI those damages proven at trial
and to have those damages trebled.
56.

PWA has incurred attorneys' fees and will continue to incur attorneys' fees

in this matter as a result of the wrongful acts of CFI. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 and -3,
PWA is likewise entitled to recover from CFI its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment — Waiver and Estoppel)
57.

PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 56 of

the Counterclaim.
58.

CFI, by and through its principals, promised, agreed and represented, among

other things, that in the event a disagreement arose the parties would submit the matter to arbitration
and that if "agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration
process" then the "buyer shall receive its money back" and the "agreement shall be null and void."
CFI knew or should have reasonably foreseen that this promise was made upon the understanding
that the parties wanted to avoid litigation at all costs and that PWA relied upon this provision in
pursuing and closing upon the sale and purchase of the Property.
59.

PWA did rely, to its detriment, upon the foregoing agreement of CFI. In

agreeing to sell the Property, PWA likewise relied upon all other terms and conditions of the
Addendum No. 1. PWA was thus directly induced into entering into the Purchase Contract as a
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result of CFI's commitment that, in the event of a dispute, if an agreement could not be reached
resolving same, the parties would go their separate ways without litigation.
60.

The acts of CFI in persuading PWA to sell the Property, to attend all of the

operative meetings and negotiation sessions with Summit County relating to the development of the
area and to retain various engineers and consultants to assist in the development, not only of its own
project, but the proposed project of CFI bars CFI from asserting any claim to the Property. By these
same acts and/or the lack of having taken any required action, CFI has further waived any such
claims it might otherwise have to the Property and the Court should so declare.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
61.

PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 60 of

the Counterclaim.
62.

CFI's breaches of the Purchase Contract, including but not limited to its

recording of a lis pendens and asserting other claims against the Property in direct violation of
section 12 of Addendum No. 1 and in breaching its many agreements with PWA that it would
cooperate with PWA to achieve the closing and that it would not claim an interest in the Property,
constitute a breach of CFI's obligations of good faith and fair dealing implied in all Utah contracts.
63.

Moreover, it was reasonably foreseeable at the time the Purchase Contract was

entered into that a breach would impair and hinder any owner's future use and development of the
Property. As a result of CFI's breach of their covenants and obligations of good faith and fair
dealing, PWA has been naturally, directly and proximately damaged, including consequential and
incidental damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.

UT DOCS A 1030375 v 1

- 22 -

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
64.

PWA incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1

through 63 of the Counterclaim.
65.

CFI did contract and agree to purchase the Property from PWA on the terms

and conditions of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1.
66.

PWA gave good and valuable consideration for its sale of the Property.

67.

In contrast, CFI has tendered virtually no consideration for this agreement.

It failed to submit its required documents as stipulated in the Purchase Contract. Except for the
submittal of a single preliminary plan, CFI has done nothing to comply with the terms of the
Purchase Contract. Inexplicably, it has now brought an action against PWA seeking specific
performance under a contract that expired by its own terms on December 31, 1998.
68.

If PWA is delayed in the development of the Property or if The Canyons SPA

cannot proceed as approved because of CFI's wrongful suit and lien, PWA is entitled to damages,
including all of the incidental or consequential damages which naturally, directly and proximately
occur as a result of CFI's breach of contract, in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, PWA prays for judgment as follows:
a.

On its First Cause of Action, for an order determining that the Purchase Contract

terminated by its own terms on December 31,1998; determining and declaring that the lis pendens
is void and of no effect; quieting title to the Property referenced herein in favor of PWA; and
determining and declaring that CFI has no right, title or interest in and to the Property;
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b.

On its Second Cause of Action, for an order adjudging the lien to be wrongful,

declaring the lis pendens void ab initio, and releasing the lis pendens from the Property, and for
treble damages, as proven at trial;
c.

On its Third Cause of Action, for an order declaring that CFI is estopped to assert,

or has waived, any claims it might have to the Property;
d.

On its Fourth Cause of Action against CFI, for damages in an amount proven at trial;

e.

On its Fifth Cause of Action against CFI, for damages in an amount proven at trial;

f.

On all causes of action, for costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and

g.

On all causes, for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and merited.
DATED this 7th day of December 1999.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

(^C<^<
Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS,
INC.,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

990600361

vs.
FARKWEST ASSOCIATES and
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court pursuant to defendants f Motion
to Dismiss and Quiet Title•
set

this Motion

for

On December 20, 1999, Judge Pat Brian

hearing

on

January

6,

2 000.

An

Order

memorializing Judge Brian's ruling was signed by this Court on
January 3, 2000.

That Order was amended in minor particulars by

the stipulation of the parties dated December 30, 1999, including
continuance

of

the

hearing

until

January

10,

2 000,

but

the

following provision was unchanged: "The scope of the hearing shall
not be limited in any respect unless an agreement between counsel
is reached prior to the commencement thereof relating to the full
release of the Lis

Pendens."

No agreement to limit the hearing was

either submitted in writing or proffered to the Court on January
10, 2000.
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Accordingly, the Court rules that the hearing was not limited
and, moreover, the hearing constituted, among other things, an
appropriate summary proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section
38-9-7, thus permitting the Court to address the issue of the
alleged wrongful lien in the form of the revised Lis

Pendens.

The issues before the Court were defendants1 Motion to Dismiss
and Quiet Title, the latter part of which specifically sought
cancellation of the Lis

Pendens,

regardless of any other rulings.

The motion was well-briefed and effectively argued by both sides.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that, based on the
numerous and substantial affidavits submitted to the Court, the
Motion to Dismiss must be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants argue that the Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the
"Contract"),

along

with

Addendum

No.

1

(the

"Addendum"),

indisputably expired on its terms; therefore, plaintiff's action
must fail on all counts and the Lis

Pendens

must be released or

canceled. Alternatively, even if there are material factual issues
that bar summary judgment in its entirety, defendants argue that
there is no basis for specific performance of the contract and
plaintiff must be limited to an action for damages.

Finally,

defendants contend that under no circumstances should the
Pendens

Lis

be allowed to stay in place, either because there is no
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equitable

principles

demand

its

cancellation.
This Court agrees that, even reading all material facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no basis for an Order
of specific performance. Without limitation, the Court finds that
the undisputed facts show that: plaintiff has not performed all of
its commitments under the Agreement and Addendum (this is true even
if the contract did not expire solely on its terms—even if the
factfinder ultimately determines that defendants1
omissions

contributed

to

the

failure

of the

acts and/or

terms);

it is

impossible for the parties to perform the Agreement and Addendum as
contemplated; and even if all other conditions existed justifying
specific performance, plaintiff has an adequate and ascertainable
remedy in damages.

On the other hand, numerous material factual

disputes bar summary judgment on the damages and related claims.
Accordingly,

defendants

are

hereby

granted

partial

summary

judgment, dismissing the First Cause of Action, with prejudice.
With respect to the final issue, in the absence of the
availability of specific performance, the justification for a Lis
Pendens

that encumbers the property and impedes an admittedly time-

sensitive project is diminished.
permitting the Lis

Pendens

The equities weigh against

to remain, and the Addendum provision
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regarding arbitration (which procedure would terminate after a mere
sixty days if unsuccessful) is evidence that the parties were
loathe to impede the development if the Agreement faltered and a
dispute ensued. To allow the Lis Pendens

to remain in force under

these circumstances would be absolutely contrary to that intention,
and the harm to defendants and other affected parties far outweighs
any potential benefit to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's own arguments,

while not persuasive to the extent that they establish a potential
right to specific performance, nevertheless give cogent support to
defendants' contention that delay in the proposed project threatens
substantial loss to many parties.
that the Lis

Pendens

Accordingly, the Court rules

shall be canceled.

Counsel for defendants shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry, granting defendants' partial summary judgment
dismissing

plaintiff's

First

Cause

of

Action

performance and further ordering that the Lis

for

Pendens

specific
shall be

withdrawn or canceled. Plaintiff's remaining claims are unaffected
by this Ruling.

.

Dated this />r day of Januaryi

ROBERT K.
DISTRICT C8B& .JUDGE y, { i
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC.,
) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
) MOTION TO DISMISS AND
> QUIET TITLE

Plaintiff,

vs.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
I

Civil No. 990600361CR

i

Judge Robert Hilder

Defendants.

The Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title filed by Park West Associates ("Park West") and
Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA") came on for hearing before the
Honorable Robert Hilder in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, on
xMonday, January 10, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Mark R. Gaylord and Craig H. Howe appeared on behalf

UT_DOCS_A 1031594 v1
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of PWA. Robert W. Payne and Todd M. Shaughnessy appeared on behalf of Central Florida
Investments, Inc. r C F r ) . On January 14, 2000, this Court entered its Minute Entry announcing
its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.
Based on the Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title and the memorandum and other materials
filed in support thereof, the opposing memorandum and supporting materials, the arguments of
counsel and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Based on the numerous and substantial affidavits submitted to the Court, PWA's

xMotion to Dismiss and Quiet Title is'treated as a motion for summary judgment;
2.

PWA's Motion is GRANTED, in part;

3.

Without limitation, the undisputed facts show that CFI has not performed all of its

commitments under the Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") and Addendum No. 1;
it is impossible for PWA and CFI to perform the Agreement and Addendum No. 1 as contemplated;
and, even if all other conditions existed justifying specific performance, CFI has an adequate and
ascertainable remedy in damages;
4.

CFI's First Cause of Action for specific performance is dismissed with prejudice; and

5.

In light of the dismissal, with prejudice, of CFI's First Cause of Action for specific

performance, CFI shall, within five (5) days after the entry of this Order, record in the Summit
County Recorder's Office a Full Release of Lis Pendens, in the form attached as Exhibit "A," which
shall fully release the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded by CFI on November 9, 1999 and the Notice
of Partial Release of Lis Pendens recorded by CFI on December 30, 1999.
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DATED this

clav ol

2000.

BY THE COURT:

lorable Robert Hilder
Third Judicial District Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND CONTENT:
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.

Alan L. Sullivan, Esq.
Robert W. Payne, Esq.
Todd M. Shaughnessy, Esq.
Attorneys for Central Florida Investments, Inc.
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INC. ,
Plaintiff,
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BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.
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Electronically recorded on
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Third District Court Judge
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Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT

1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: ( 801)377-0027

^

-21

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 17, 2000)

3

THE COURT: This is the matter of Central Florida

4

Investments, Inc. versus Park West Associates, et al., case

5

990600361.

6

Counsel, please state appearances.

7
8
9
10
11
12

It's the defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

MR. GAYLORD: Mark Gaylord and Craig Howe appearing on
behalf of the defendants, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. PAYNE: Robert Payne appearing on behalf of Central
Florida Investments, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, and thank you for,

13

Mr. Payne, the binder with all of the pleadings in the cases.

14

I have read everything that was provided, and I appreciate it

15

being provided so well.

16

You may proceed as you wish, Mr. Gaylord.

17

MR. GAYLORD: Thank you, your Honor.

Why we're here,

18

as the Court already knows, we're here on defendant's motion to

19

compel arbitration, your Honor.

20

January 10tn for an additional motion.

You may recall we were here on

21

THE COURT: I remember well.

22

MR. GAYLORD: And the Court has ruled on that.

The

23

dispute that is at issue here is a dispute over the terms and

24

conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract.

25

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

073f
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MR. GAYLORD: The plaintiff, CFI, which is a very

2

sophisticated and experienced land development from Orlando,

3

Florida, has filed this action in effort to grab in breach of

4

their agreement and in breach of that agreement the Frostwood

5

property, about a 20 acre parcel of the property, which is an

6

essential piece of the Canyons Development.

7

recall -- and if you don't mind, I'll come up to the chart.

As the Court may

8

THE COURT: Go ahead.

9

MR. GAYLORD: The Frostwood property is property that

10

is outlined here in the shaded area, but is one integral part

11

of a much larger 7,000 acre development called the Canyons, I

12

think the Court's aware of.

13

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

14

MR. GAYLORD: And the property that is in dispute, for

15

purposes of this litigation, is actually the 14-acre parcel

16

and I've got it upside down —

17

the subject of the Real Estate Purchase Contract.

—

but the 14-acre parcel that's

18

THE COURT: All right.

19

MR. GAYLORD: So as a precursor to that, that's where

20

the dispute lies.

21

to compel CFI to arbitrate the disagreements that have arisen

22

between it and Park West over the terms of the agreement.

23

sure the Court has read the memoranda.

24

question to begin with, I'm happy to answer those.

25

The purpose of this hearing, of course, is

I'm

If the Court has any

THE COURT: I have, and maybe not questions as much as

-4
1

focusing where I'm concerned.

2

the waiver argument.

3

the question of whether they need to rise from the agreement,

4

but I know we'll hear more about that from the plaintiffs.

5

think waiver is a very significant issue here.

6

I think your biggest problem is

I don't think it's as big an issue as on

I

I'm quite familiar with Chandler; just by coincidence,

7

that was in my firm.

8

with the partner who dealt with that day in and day out.

9

remember when that was all settled, he said, "Whatever you do,

10

We had Mass Mutual, and I was very close
I

don't get involved in a litigation if you want arbitration."

11

MR. GAYLORD: Okay.

12

THE COURT: I do see your point about the lis pendens,

13

but didn't you do more 9

14

MR. GAYLORD: Didn't we do what?

15

THE COURT: Didn't you do more than address the lis

16

pendens, which I understand the urgency there.

17

correctly, didn't you bring it under the expedited Statute 30?

18

If I remember

MR. GAYLORD: We did, your Honor, bring it up under

19

that statute, and I'll address that straight out.

I think that

20

it's important to understand what the Court said in its minute

21

entry, because the lis pendens issue was important to us, and

22

because of the way that the action was filed, the Court said

23

and the Court recognized in its effort to dismiss the portion

24

of the cause of action for specific performance —

25

said, "The equities weigh against permitting the lis pendens

the Court

—

1

to remain, and the addendum provision regarding arbitration,

2

which procedure would terminate after a mere 60 days if

3

unsuccessful is evidence that the parties were loathe to

4

impede the development if the agreement faulted in a disputing

5

suit."

6

Now, because of the method or the course of action

7

that the plaintiff took here, which is instead of moving to

8

arbitrate, which the agreement expressly provides, they filed

9

an action.

10
11

Filed an action against the development that had

time restraints.
As the Court may recall when we were here in January,

12

there was a significant number of affidavits submitted that

13

indicated the failure to begin construction and improvement

14

of golf course, which was time based, could have a detrimental

15

affect on the entitlements to the Frostwood property, as well

16

as other property owners within the Canyons Development.

17

So consequently, the defendants were faced with a

18

difficult task.

19

the specific performance claims kicked out, while at the same

20

time we need to arbitrate?"

21

fact did indicate to the plaintiffs the need to arbitrate

22

pursuant to the provisions of the contract, but because of

23

the pendency of the litigation, we had to immediately move to

24

dismiss, and to seek to get the lis pendens released so that it

25

didn't hinder the development project, and the Court suggested

That is, "How do we get the lis pendens and

We could have certainly, and

m

-61

that in its ruling, I think.

2

In addition, just I think also as we go through the

3

process, Mr. Segal, David Segal, who was the president of the

4

plaintiff, admitted in his affidavit that CFI was anxious that

5

the aeal not be delayed, to insure that its timeshare units

6

were completed by the 2002 Winter Olympics.

7

Ergo, why did we change to modify the initial Real

8

Estate Purchase Contract to contain a new arbitration clause

9

in the addendum9

The purpose for it and the purpose for the

10

parties agreeing to it was to avoid the very litigation we find

11

ourselves in here today.

12

THE COURT: Uh-huh

13

MR. GAYLORD: What the agreement says —

and I will get

14

to your issue on the waiver, because I think it's an important

15

issue, but I think it's also important to understand and see

16

what the provisions that are in conflict are, and why —

17

can address the waiver issue.

18

then I

The parties conflict, and what plaintiffs argue

19

is paragraph 15 is not in conflict with paragraph 12 of the

20

addendum.

21

Purchase Contract that the parties agree that any dispute or

22

claim related to this contract, including but not limited to

23

the disposition of the earnest money deposit, and the breach

24

or termination of this contract shall first be submitted to

25

arbitration.

In paragraph 15 provides in part in the Real Estate

Then it goes on and talks about the means of

-71

arbitration.

2

They say that can be read concurrently with the

3

addendum, which contains in paragraph 12 the quote that

4

"Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be

5

arbitrated by parties, agreed upon by both buyer and seller.

6

If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the

7

beginning of an arbitration process, buyer shall receive

8

its money back, and this agreement shall be null and void."

9

Now, the importance of these two provisions, and

10

the reason that I —

11

conflict with paragraph 12 is because there is a disagreement,

12

it shall be arbitrated.

13

to be "What is the remedy'*"

14

that the defendants contend that is in

Well, the disagreement here is going

In this paragraph it says, "You first must mediate."

15

It then goes on, if the Court may recall -- and I can put it up

16

here —

17

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

18

MR. GAYLORD: it then goes on even more and talks about

19

first of all you have to go through the rules.

You follow the

20

buyer and seller, use the Real Estate Mediation Rules of the

21

American Arbitration Association.

22

its own costs.

23

to the mediation shall be binding, and if mediation fails,

24

procedures applicable and remedies available under this

25

contract shall apply."

"Each party agrees to bear

Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant

-81

Then it goes through and says, "Nothing in this

2

section shall prohibit the buyer from seeking specific

3

performance," and also "The parties may agree in writing to

4

waive mediation."

5

to mediate.

6

Well, the parties agreed to arbitrate, not

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

From the first reading of that

7

language, that 60-aay provision, it's always troubled me in

8

the back of my mind that when it talked about failure to reach

9

agreement in 60 days, that's more a mediation concept than an

10

arbitration concept.

So I don't think it helps —

11

another confusion to me, but it's a confusion.

it's just

12

MR. GAYLORD: Whether it's a mediation or arbitration

13

concept, your Honor, the key is what's the remedy in the end.

14

What the parties contracted for is whether it's a mediation or

15

an arbitration, what the parties contracted for is the remedy,

16

and that's what's important here.

17

The remedy is contract —

they get back here this

18

morning, and the contract is null and void if they can't reach

19

an agreement on the terms of the dispute.

20
21

THE COURT: But you don't reach an agreement on an
arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord?

It's imposed upon you.

22

MR. GAYLORD: Ordinarily, yes, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Yes, and then it comes to one other issue

24

for me that no one raised directly, but it troubled me, too, as

25

I read.

That is, in this case —

I mean, what I said in the

-9m m u t e entry I think is correct.

There was definitely an

intent to not let this drag out, but isn't it possible that
this is a sham in the sense that if you can —

if this is sort

of an agreement thing, if I say, "Arbitrate," you have your 60day provision, if it can just be dragged out 60 days, it's all
over.

It could be —

the whole intent could be thwarted.

MR. GAYLORD: Certainly the intent to be thwarted, I
guess if there's any cause of action that it stems from, is if
there was a bad faith effort in the context of the arbitration.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. GAYLORD: If somehow we don't have a reasonable
effort to try and reach an agreement.

What the arbitration

provision provides, I think, is the arbitration provision
provides that, look, we have a Real Estate Purchase Contract
that was entered into early on in the process.
what Summit County was going to do.

We didn't know

This is what they had

hoped for, and if we could meet those terms and conditions
based upon a collective effort, not just by Park West, but
by CFI.
As the Court may recall, one of the factors the Court
looked at in whether specific performance could be implied, is
was there an impossibility of performance, and whether or not
CFI had complied with its side of the bargain.
think, found that it didn't.

So

The Court, I

—

THE COURT: Uh-huh, I remember.

H7QQ
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MR. GAYLORD: And so we're sitting at a point where we

2

have two parties who may want to still structure a deal, so

3

they have an arbitration clause that says, "Look, if we don't

4

have the agreement as we've currently written it, we've got an

5

arbitration clause.

6

a new deal."

7

Let's see if we can sit down and negotiate

If we can't, all you're going to do is get back

8

your earnest money.

We don't want to have to waste our time

9

fighting over, you know, whether you have what you have, and

10

if they don't, they get a null and void.

11

and void because they don't want to delay it any further, if

12

they can't reach an agreement on what the development will look

13

like.

14

It's rendered null

So that's what the purpose of the agreement was, and

15

that's what both sides will say.

16

had an arbitration clause.

17

to it.

18

if there was a dispute over the terms of the contract, because

19

there is a dispute over what happens to the earnest money.

20

Both sides will say that they

They put it in there.

They agreed

Yet they couldn't reach an agreement on an arbitration

They think they get to file a litigation, pursuant to

21

paragraph 15.

Our position is they don't.

Why don't they?

22

Because if you look at two things; one, if you look at the

23

addendum, it says, "To the extent the terms of this addendum

24

modify or conflict with any provisions of the RVPC, including

25

all prior addendum counter offers, these terms shall control."

-111

I submit that there was a conflict between these two,

2

because the conflict arises from the disposition of the earnest

3

money deposit.

4

what the disposition of the earnest money contract is —

5

is, if they can't reach agreement on the arbitration.

6

it gets back, and that's it.

7

and file a lawsuit."

8

If you look down here, paragraph 12 tells you
money

It is,

They say, "No, we can go ahead

There's a conflict there.

More importantly is, under subsection 16 of the RAPC

9

it says, "Where a section of this contract provides a specific

10

remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive,

11

regardless of rights, which might otherwise be available under

12

common law. "

13

The exclusive remedy under this arbitration clause is

14

that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void.

15

the remedy.

16

wouldn't litigate this case, because of the time frames that

17

they were operating under.

18

That's

They agreed when they signed the deal that they

Yeah, they want to now bring back 15 and say, "But we

19

can file a lawsuit.

20

successful mediation, then we're going to proceed with our

21

litigation.

22

If we first mediate, and if we don't have

I submit that this was to wipe out paragraph 15, and

23

intended to be a replacement.

It's in direct conflict with

24

that, and it can't be read together, and because it can't be

25

read together, it must file the addendum.

The addendum is

-12controlling.
To address the issue of waiver, your Honor, unless the
Court has any other questions.
THE COURT: No, I confess I don't.

I think I agree

with you, and I'll hear argument, that as a general rule, the
addendum should control, but if the addendum doesn't really
provide anything, then I'm wondering where we are.

That's

where I'm struggling; if it really does provide an arbitration
option.
Generally when we order arbitration we're saying,
"This is not going to be your forum.

Arbitration is.

You

are going to get a binding decision out of a neutral partial
arbitration," supposedly.
Here, though, it's such a hybrid of arbitration and
mediation, with the ability to say that if agreement doesn't
occur within 60 days, you've got nothing except —
this was the intent —
money.

and maybe

you've got nothing but the earnest

We're all moving on because the project is paramount

thing here.

Is that what you're saying?

MR. GAYLORD: Well, in fact, I think that's exactly
what Mr. Segal is saying in his affidavit.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. GAYLORD: He's suggesting in his affidavit that
time is of the essence.
essence clause.

In the contract it has a time of the

He says, "Based upon my visit with Brent

n'-/ A n

-13Ferrin — " this is reading from paragraph 7.

''Based upon my

visit with Brent Ferrin, I decided to see if I should purchase
the Frostwood property.

I was very interested in the terms

upon Park West was offering the CFI parcel.

I understood that

the Frostwood parcel was reserved quality real estate, being
sold with all the necessary zoning and permitting (inaudible).
Thus upon purchasing the property, CFI could quickly commence
construction on the property in plenty of time to complete
construction for 2002 Winter Olympics."
However, we're now tied up in litigation.

There is

no way that this litigation will be conducted and completed in
time for litigation.
THE COURT: The litigation probably wouldn't —

is the

project at a halt, or has the prior actions of the Court at
least allowed things to go forward?

I mean, what's the status?

MR. GAYLORD: The project is not at a halt, and in fact
the project is moving forward.

Because of the release of the

lis pendens, we're in the position —

our clients are of the

view they have no contractual obligation to CFI.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. GAYLORD: However, they've expressed a willingness,
I think, between the parties, that if they want to sit down
and talk about a new deal, they can.
counterclaim.
25

As you know, we filed a

We filed a counterclaim that there had been a

breach of contract on the other side, and they have no rights

n

-14under the Real Estate Purchase Agreement.
times back to our argument is —

As you may recall,

one of the arguments is the

contract terminated on its own.
4 I

THE COURT: Yeah.

5

MR. GAYLORD: And so we don't think they have a cause

6

of action.

We don't think they have a valid claim.

Yet our

7

position is we ought to move to compel to arbitrate, and we

8

will arbitrate whatever disputes they want, including whether

9

they're entitled to develop the property.

But we say that the

10

contract terminated by some terms, which in and of itself is

11

a dispute over the terms of the contract.

12

submission is that paragraph 12 of the addendum is controlling,

13

and of course shouldn't even consider paragraph 15 for purposes

14

of the motion.

15

So, you know, our

As to the issue of waiver, your Honor, I think it's

16

very simple.

17

need to compel arbitration, and that in the November 12th

18

letter, four days after the complaint was filed, I wrote a

19

letter to Counsel for CFI and stated, quote, "Due to the

20

termination of the purchase contract, the filing of the

21

complaint, the recording of the lis pendens was improper."

22

From day one, the defendants have asserted the

Paragraph 12 of the addendum No. 1 expressly provides

23

that, quote, "Any agreement over the terms of this agreement

24

shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both buyer and

25

seller."
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Paragraph 12 was included in the parties agreement for

2

the express purpose of avoiding litigation.

3

this paragraph supercedes and replaces Section 15 of the

4

purchase agreement, and that it conflicts with the rights of

5

the parties to submit the matter to mediation, since terms of

6

the addendum modify and conflict with Section 15 and the terms

7

that addendum No. 1 controlled.

8

that notice.

9

More importantly,

On November 12th we gave them

In our motion to dismiss, footnote 3, we indicate to

10

the Court, and in fact at the hearing I commented just on —

11

didn't delve into it, but we offhandedly commented that, you

12

know, alternatively the Court could certainly compel us to

13

arbitrate this proceeding.

14

dismiss, we set forth our demand for arbitration.

15

we

So immediately upon the motion to

In addition, on the time —

date to filed our motion

16

to dismiss, the defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim.

17

Mr. Payne and the plaintiff makes light of the fact that "Well,

18

gee, our answer doesn't contain an affirmative defense, that

19

arbitration is the appropriate means."

20

Yet our counterclaim, which is attached and is part

21

of the answer and counterclaim, in four of the five causes of

22

action assert that the remedy in this case is arbitration.

23

So to suggest to the Court that we didn't even raise it in

24

our answer that the counterclaim is a bit disingenuous.

25

there repeatedly throughout the counterclaim the demands of

It's
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2

arbitrati on.
Furthermore, with in- eight days after the Court ente red

3

its order dismissing -- or in favor of our summary judgment

4

motion on the lis per dens and the s peci fie performance we fi led

5

our motion to compel, so the delay is not there.

6

If you're familiar with the Chandler case, your Honor,

7

I think you'll recognize in that case there was a considerable

8

amount of discovery that went on.

9

depositions, I think.

Particularly there were five

One of which was taken down in Florida,

10

and there were I think, if I recall, at least three sets of

11

discovery, written discovery requests that were sent out.

12

That simply has not occurred in this case.

I know

13

plaintiffs says, "We started to draft some discovery, and

14

stopped after we got the motion to compel."

15

Honor that the amount of discovery in the case in that instance

16

was very different than the situation here.

17

Real Estate Purchase Contract that's involved.

18

a development that was time intensive.

19

an insurance contract, and so the circumstances were very

20

different.

21

I submit to your

You don't have a
You don't have

It was a dispute over

You also, under the paragraph 15, it doesn't bar, for

22

example, the plaintiffs —

23

seeking legal redress in the Courts.

24

buyer permits the seller to refrain from the answer in the

25

complaint by the mediation.

or the defendants from concurrently
It just says that the
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1

However, if the lis pendens is causing damage to

2

the seller because they don't believe that the contract is in

3

force, certainly we shouldn't have to sit and wait for that lis

4

pendens and the arbitration proceeding to go forward to get the

5

relief that we felt was necessary in order to (inaudible) time

6

constraints.

7

Finally, I guess, as to the issue of waiver, your

8

Honor.

9

under the time constraints of the rules.

I mean, we did provide Rule 26-A disclosures, I think,
We had an obligation

10

to do that.

Other than that, we really have taken no discovery

11

whatsoever.

They have also, I think, your Honor, failed to

12

demonstrate any prejudice, as a result of the short delay —

13

would call it a short delay in moving to compel arbitration.

14

mean, I don't even think it's a delay.

15

the issue from the get-go.

16

the subsequent ruling demonstrates the prejudice.

17

they're wrong.

18

I

I think we've raised

The claim substitute —

they claim
I think

The issue that we sought was simply to eliminate the

19

specific performance, which this Court found their claim was

20

wrongful, that the lis pendens was wrongful, and therefore our

21

motion was well taken.

22

I

The claims of form shopping lack any evidence, and

23

the claims of substantial expense in their own pleadings, they

24

indicate that the expense was tied towards defending the motion

25

to dismiss, which the Court granted us, and in fact, under the
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1

Real Estate Purchase Contract we would be entitled to recover

2

our fees, as a result of the motion for the partial summary

3

judgment being granted in our favor.

4

Based upon the express terms of the parties agreement,

5

your Honor, Park West respectfully requests this Court to enter

6

an order compelling the parties to arbitrate their agreement,

7

in accordance with paragraph 12 of the addendum.

8
9

We further ask this Court to dismiss this action on
the grounds that the remedy available to the parties lies

10

exclusively within paragraph 12, which is if we don't reach

11

agreement through the arbitration, the contract is null and

12

void, and their only remedy is a recovery of their earnest

13

money.

14

kind of an order, a nd we would ask the Court to do so, your

15

Honor.

We believe the Court has the authority to enter that

16

Do es the C ourt have any questions?

17

THE COURT: No.

18

Mr . Payne.

19

MR . PAYNE: Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Gayl ord.

We would agree that

20

the Court --- the most compelling argument before the Court is

21

waiver, but we don' t want to suggest that we think that the

22

contract provisions that have been relied up on by Mr

23

in fact —

24

are not appropriate

25

Gaylord

that our interpretation of those contract provisions

In fact, as the Court has noticed, there is no real

-19-

1

remedy p rovided by paragraph 12 in the addendum, and in fact we

2

submit that the pu.cpose of that provision, your Honor, was to

3

allow th(5 parties, who both at the time they entered into the

4

contract had the desire and the mutual goal to develop the

5

property as a team, essentially , to go forward with the

6

project; and that in the event that there was a dispute, a

7

legitimate dispute between the ]oarties about what they had

8

agreed to do, that they should then submit that to 60 days of

9

arbitration, which really was much more like mediation, figure

10

out what they meant, make sure they had a meeting of the minds,

11

and then go forward with the project.

12

What was not intended by the parties was Park West

13

could use that provision as a fulcrum to pursue a relationship

14

with a different buyer, and to walk away with no other remedy

15

to CFI than the return of the earnest money.

16

Your Honor, there is no sense of urgency now.

We have

17

a hearing on January 10th.

18

the lis pendens should stay in place.

19

that issue before going forward with the project.

20

didn't agree with our position, dismissed the lis pendens

21

or released the lis pendens, dismissed the claim for specific

22

performance, and has allowed CFI —

23

with the project.

24
25

We argue to the Court that in fact
That we should resolve
The Court
—

or Park West to go forward

Now the issue before the Court is damages.

In fact,

contrary to Mr. Gaylord's representations concerning what their
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1

motion to dismiss —

2

judgment was all about, was much more than simply an attempt to

3

release a lis pendens.

4

Court dismissed some of our claims for specific performance,

5

but in fact left in place —

6

the remaining claims on (inaudible) the damages.

7

which in reality was a motion for summary

In fact, in the Court's ruling, the

denied the motion with respect to

Essentially Park West's argument, your Honor, is that

8

the parties when they reached agreement negotiated away their

9

typical right to come before a Court and have issues of breach

10

of contract resolved by a Court.

Instead what they put

m

11

place was a 60-day arbitration period, where the parties would

12

try to agree to resolve their disputes, and if they couldn't

13

do so, then the only remedy that remained was the return of

14

the earnest money.

15

We, as I have just indicated, strongly disagree with

16

that, but assuming that was what the parties agreed to do, it

17

is quite clear from the Chandler case that Park West could

18

waive that right.

19

CFI brought this action because they disagreed with

20

that interpretation of the contract and believed that they

21

had a contractual right to pursue a legal remedy, and it was

22

incumbent upon Park West if they believed that arbitration was

23

the only way that parties were allowed to go, to present that

24

to the Court.

25

It is our obligation and our burden to demonstrate a

-21waiver in this case.

To do so, we have to demonstrate to the

Court that Park West has participated in the litigation to a
point which is inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and
that in fact that CFI has been prejudiced.
Your Honor, if I may approach

—

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. PAYNE: -- the exhibit stand here, and I apologize.
I typically reduce this.
side.

I'm just going to have to come at the

We've put together this chronology, your Honor, that we

believe accurately and fully demonstrates the events that have
taken place that in fact waive Park West's right to pursue
arbitration to the extent that they have that right.
Your Honor, on November 9th, CFI filed its complaint
against Park West.

On December 8th, Park West filed its answer,

and in that answer it asserted 14 affirmative defenses, and
did not assert as an affirmative defense the right to pursue
arbitration.
In connection with the answer, your Honor, on the
same date filed a counterclaim against Park West.

Contrary

to Mr. Gaylord's representation, it was not a demand for
arbitration.

In fact, what they sought to do was to terminate

the contract, to quiet title to the property, to obtain damages
for their allegation of a wrongful lien, to argue waiver and
estoppel, to argue a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the contract, and to argue a breach of the

0751

-221

contract itself.

2

and asking for a release of the lien.

3

Much more than simply coming into the Court

In connection with the motion for partial summary

4

judgment which was filed on the same day, although it was

5

styled as a motion to dismiss, it was submitted with nine

6

affidavits, and I believe the Court's ruling was that in fact

7

it had to be treated as a motion for partial summary judgment.

8
9

In that motion they sought a summary and determination
that the contract itself had expired.

I think if you look at

10

the pleadings between the parties, there was a great deal of

11

briefing on whether or not the parties had waived their right,

12

whether it had been extended by the parties, and again, much

13

more than simply asking the Court to release a lien.

14

It sought a decision from the Court that the lis

15

pendens was wrongful.

16

claims were barred by the doctrine of latches.

17

of the lis pendens for reasons of equity, but did not anywhere

18

m

19

It sought a determination that CFI's
Sought release

there seek dismissal on the bases of mandatory arbitration.
Mr. Gaylord has made reference to footnote 3 in their

20

memorandum, which references the fact of arbitration, the

21

arbitration provision.

22

there is a great difference between making the Court aware

23

of an arbitration provision, and asking the Court to compel

24

arbitration.

25

used the arbitration provision as a means to get what they

We would submit to the Court that

We believe that in fact what they did is they
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wanted with the Court.
The hearing then was held on January 10th.

2

In that

3

hearing there was no argument to the Court that it should

4

compel arbitration.

5

on January 14th, and in that memorandum decision, you set forth

6

your reasons for affirming —

7

the motion for partial summary judgment.

8

The Court issued its memorandum decision

or granting and denying in part

I think that it's very significant, then, that from

9

January 14th to March 8th, your Honor, there was no motion

10

presented to the Court to compel arbitration in this case.

11

Instead what happened is on February 4th, plaintiffs and

12

defendants participated in a Rule 26-F conference.

13

In that conference they agree upon a schedule of dates

14

for litigation.

15

and in there Park West made no demand on CFI to pursue the

16

arbitration.

17

They met and they talked about their claims,

The parties agreed upon the form of a scheduling

18

order that was presented to the Court, and again, there was no

19

insistence that there be any reference at all to arbitration.

20

Then finally a month after that, the parties exchanged initial

21

disclosures, as they had agreed to do so in the Rule 26-F

22

conference.

23

Chandler, we believe, your Honor, is the controlling

24

case.

We agree that there are some differences between this

25

case and Chandler.

Some differences that may play in Park
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West's favor, but also some differences that very much play in

2

favor of CFI.

3

month delay between the filing of the complaint and the —

4

excuse me.

5

case there was a four month delay.

6

In both cases, your Honor, there was a five-

In Chandler there was a five-month delay.

In Chandler there were —

or

In this

Very similar.
the Court noted there were

7

affirmative defenses made to the complaint, but that there was

8

no reference to the affirmative defenses to arbitration.

9

that case there were cross claims made against other parties,

10

but no counterclaims.

11

In

In our case there are counterclaims.

Unlike in Chandler, Park West participated with CFI in

12

scheduling dates for litigation, and doing the kinds of things

13

that you would do in fact to express an intent to proceed with

14

litigation rather than arbitration, and in this case, very

15

significantly, unlike in Chandler, there was a motion for

16

partial summary judgment.

17

We would also —

I just mentioned briefly the Taos

18

case and the Wood case that were referred by the Court in

19

Chandler.

20

summary judgment.

21

that the Court noted that one of the affirmative defenses

22

asserted by the defendant included a claim for arbitration.

23

The Court said in that case that but for that mention of the

24

arbitration provision, that the Court might well have presumed

25

there to be a waiver, and in this case, again, there was no

In the Taos case, again there was a motion for
We think it's significant in that case
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2

reference to arbitration in the answer.
In the Taos case, which was cited and relied upon by

3

the Court throughout Chandler, the New Mexico Court stated

4

that, quote, "The waiver of the right of arbitration may be

5

inferred from the decision to take advantage of the judicial

6

system, whether through discovery or direct invocation of the

7

Court's discretionary power, or both."

8
9

In the Wood case, which is quite similar to our case,
in the Wood case that's cited by the Court in Chandler, there

10

was no discovery.

11

that case the Court stated that, quote, "The point of no return

12

is reached when the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes

13

the Court's discretionary power prior to demanding arbitration

14

on a question other than the demand for arbitration."

15

Court recognized that to hold otherwise would permit a party

16

to resort to a Court action until an unfavorable decision had

17

been reached and then switch to arbitration.

18

There was a motion for summary judgment.

In

The

It's our position here, your Honor, that Park West

19

took a calculated risk.

What it asked the Court to do, and

20

it's very clear from its motion for summary judgment, is to

21

dismiss the complaint and all of the claims, and be done with

22

the matter.

23

this Court that that was going to be the case.

24

of their relief in the lis pendens.

25

So they decided, "Well, then we ought now to go and try and go

They hoped that what they could do is convince
They got part

They didn't get all of it.

-261

back to the arbitration panel, do our 60 days, not agree, and

2

then be out of it that way.''

3
4

In their briefing they cite the Williams case out of
the Fifth Circuit.

I would just like to touch upon that.

5 J case is quite distinguishable on one fact.

That

That is that Signa,

6

the defendant in the action, did not realize that it had the

7

right to pursue arbitration.

8

they found that they had the right to arbitrate, they asserted

9

it.

10

The Court found that as soon as

Similarly they hadn't answered prior to the time that they

moved to compel arbitration, and filed after.

11

On the issue of prejudice, your Honor, my client has

12

expended tens of thousands of dollars responding to a motion

13

for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all of the claims in

14

this case.

15

Court, and the Court in Chandler specifically mentioned that

16

prejudice —

17

briefing and arguing the dispositive motion.

18

It was fully briefed.

It was fully argued to the

one of the ways that prejudice can be shown is by

In addition to the briefing and arguing of the motion

19

for summary judgment, we've spent time negotiating dates for

20

the litigation, drafting the scheduling order, exchanging the

21

initial disclosures.

22

requests that would have been filed the week following when

23

we got the motion to compel, and there has been a four-month

24

delay.

25

We have spent time drafting discovery

Assuming that the arbitration provision was —

their
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interpretation of that provision is correct, this should have

2

been resolved in two months.

3

line; four months before they even filed their motion to

4

compel.

5

We're now six months down the

One other point I wanted to raise is that filing a

6

motion for summary judgment was not the logical response to the

7

complaint if what Park West wanted was to pursue arbitration.

8

The logical response would have been to file a motion to compel

9

arbitration, and a motion -to dismiss based upon the terms of

10

the contract, and had the Court in fact done that, if the Court

11

had agreed with the interpretation of the contract, dismissed

12

the action, there was no basis upon which to continue with a

13

lis pendens.

14

78-40-202 of the Utah Code provides the lis pendens

15

is filed in connection with an action.

16

there is no lis pendens.

17

they wanted to pursue arbitration, was to present that argument

18

to the Court.

19

have all of their claims dismissed.

20

Okay.

If there is no action,

So what Park West needed to do if

They didn't do that.

Instead they sought to

I just want to talk briefly about the remedy

21

provisions —

22

contract.

23

this Court's obligation to reconcile all of the terms and

24

provisions of a contract.

25

or the dispute resolution provisions in the

As Park West has appropriately recognized, it is

That is not what Park West is asking the Court to do.

-281

Park West is asking the Court essentially to ignore paragraph

2

15 of the contract, and paragraph 16 of the contract, which

3

both talk about the seller's —

4

remedies, which included specific performance, and included

5

the right to pursue damages.

6

or excuse me, the buyer's

I think this was a very interesting exhibit, because

7

essentially what it in a very real way shows to the Court is

8

that if there was no right to pursue particular provisions, it

9

was very easy for the parties to specify it in the contract by,

10

in fact, crossing it out.

11

this was not done.

12

did paragraph 16, which both gave to Park West —

13

Central Florida Investments the right to pursue damages and

14

specific performance.

15

I just want the Court to recognize

This provision remained in the contract, as
or excuse me,

We would just submit that the addendum was intended to

16

allow the parties to quickly resolve the dispute about terms,

17

so that they could mutually proceed with the contract, and with

18

the project.

19

It was not a means to allow either party to get out

20

on 60 days of arbitration/mediation the failure to agree and

21

go their separate ways.

22

I mean, that interpretation is very detrimental to Central

23

Florida Investments.

24

we get back the earnest money.

25

whoever they want and go forward with the project.

Really, that interpretation only

—

If they don't agree, our only remedy is
They're allowed to sell it to
I think

-291 I that's all I have.
2 I

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Payne.

3

Final word, Mr. Gaylord.

4

MR. GAYLORD: If I could, your Honor.

5

up where he left off, which is sometimes a good place.

6

provision that he refers to doesn't make sense if the parties

7

intended to simply resolve disputes.

8

you don't resolve the dispute?

9

To suggest that it was intended solely to —

Let me take
The

I mean, what happens if

The contract is null and void.
that if we have a

10

disagreement about an agreement or a provision in the contract,

11

then we'll go and try to figure that one out, and of course,

12

we're going to do a mutual agreement, we're going to be a team

13

to develop the property.

14

If that were the case, then it would have had no

15

purpose in drafting the language that's there that says if we

16

can't reach an agreement through arbitration on the terms, and

17

the dispute of the terms, it's null and void.

18

So consequently I think it runs directly contrary,

19

but again, it's very specific in its remedy.

20

reach an agreement, and if the arbitration isn't successful,

21

the contract is null and void.

22

make sense as well to the other side.

23

If you can't

So I think that it doesn't

As to the waiver argument, your Honor, I mean, I think

24

you simply need to go to the November 12th letter.

25

12th letter that we wrote to them four days after the complaint

The November
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—

three days after complaint was filed indicated specifically

2

the arbitration provision.

3

didn't commence at that point is not indicative of the intent

4

of the parties to arbitrate.

5

Now, the fact that the arbitration

Under the Chandler case, it requires a showing by

6

the plaintiff m

7

arbitrate.

8

arbitration provision controls.

9

to cite and who continue to proceed.

10

this case an inconsistency with intent to

The November 12th letter is very specific, that the
They're the ones who continue
We have one choice.

Mr. Payne gets up and says, "Well, the way you should

11

have done it is you should have filed this motion to compel

12

arbitration, and simultaneously move to dismiss."

13

your Honor that's exactly what we did.

14

I submit to

At the hearing the Court may recall we did not push

15

and did not address in any detail the other grounds for why

16

this case should be dismissed, other than the contract had

17

terminated by its own terms.

18

with that argument, and the specific performance and the

19

wrongfulness of the lis pendens.

20

Then we focused almost entirely

Although our motions had a considerable amount more

21

in them, the hearing focus was towards specific performance

22

and m

23

and the grounds upon which the specific performance they were

24

not entitled to, which was the impossibility of the contract,

25

and their failure to perform under the terms of the contract.

fact the provision in here that they aren't entitled,
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We indicated in that hearing the issue —

2

a gratuitous, I guess, statement that there is also an

3

arbitration clause, and that's another remedy.

4

although it was

Your Honor, there is a presumption against waiver

5

when it comes to the arbitration clause, and I think the Court

6

—

7

to demonstrate waiver from the get-go if we go back an look at

8

his chart.

9

it's their burden to come forward with sufficient evidence

I think it's important to recognize that the amount

10

of work done really does not indicate and does not rise to the

11

level of the Chandler case.

12

the November 12th letter in there, where we expressly reflect

13

the issue of arbitration.

14

an affirmative defense for arbitration is belied by the fact

15

that in the counterclaim over and over again we talk about the

16

arbitration provision.

17

Interestingly he fails to mention

The mere fact that we don't contain

Paragraph 14 of the complaint quotes directly the

18

arbitration provision.

19

because of the arbitration provision.

20

quiet title because

of

That they're in breach of the contract

the

That we're entitled to

arbitration breach.

21

In addition, in the motion to dismiss, at paragraphs

22

8, 29 and 30, in footnotes 2, 3 and 4, we make a reference to

23

the arbitration provisions.

24

we were very cognizant of the issue of arbitration, that it

25

certainly is a remedy both parties had before them, but we had

So we submit to the Court that
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a more pressing issue.

We had a lis pendens that had to be

2

released, regardless of whether we proceeded with arbitration,

3

on whether the contract terminated, or whether or not the

4

earnest money was the sole remedy of which they were entitled

5

to recover, based upon the breaches —

6

between the parties, based upon the interpretation of the

7

contract.

the alleged breaches

8

Your Honor, I submit to the Court we have provided the

9

Court with substantial basis upon which the Court should compel

10

arbitration, force the parties to go and meet the bargain that

11

they agreed, which is arbitration under clause 12, and we would

12

ask the Court to enter an order compelling arbitration, and

13

dismiss the (inaudible).

14

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gaylord.

I think there is

15

a policy and it's continuing to evolve to favor arbitration

16

agreements, and I think the Courts where they can, do compel

17

arbitration.

18

one, it's agreed upon between the parties; and perhaps —

19

hope that's not my motivation —

20

Court's docket somewhat.

21

to their day in Court, unless there is a clear arbitration

22

alternative.

I think because one, it's a more rapid remedy;
I

is because it relieves the

Nevertheless, people have a right

23

Now, the waiver argument, there is certainly actions

24

by the defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration.

25

On the other hand, there were actions that were consistent.

I
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1

am not persuaded that waiver applies in this case, but that

2

doesn't resolve the issue for me, because before a Court

3

should order arbitration, I think it needs to be persuaded

4

that arbitration is a bonafide option.

5

As I look at this case as carefully as I can, I look

6

at the arbitration provision.

7

used by the defendants and relied upon by the Court to some

8

extent in ruling on the lis pendens and the other issues in

9

January to determine that in fact there was any —

I think it was appropriately

it was

10

evidence of the intent of the parties to not impede the

11

project.

12

provision, I think it's not even an arbitration provision.

13

I think that's clear, but the more I look at that

In any event, if I was to refer this matter or compel

14

arbitration, I think I would be compelling plaintiffs to go

15

into a forum where they are almost doomed to no remedy, nothing

16

more than to be back where they were before, and I don't think

17

that's an appropriate use of the arbitration mechanism.

18
19

I'm denying the motion to compel.
and order, Mr. Payne.

20

MR. PAYNE: I will.

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

(Hearing concluded.)

23
24
25

Would you prepare
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outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore, the name associated with the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS,
INC.,

I
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Plaintiff,
Case No. 990600361 CR
vs.
Honorable Robert Hilder
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and BEAVER
CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration came regularly before the Honorable Robert
Hilder on May 17,2000. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted
by the parties, and based on argument of counsel and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby
denied.
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MADE AND ENTERED t h i s ^ L flay of May, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

RO^HITHILDER ~
Third Judicial District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Mark R. Gaylord >
Craig H. Howe
Ballard Spahr Andrews & IngersoU
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